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ABSTRACT
I identify an unexplored type of institutional investor (equity boutiques) that are characterized
by their relatively small size but highly concentrated investment strategy. This concentrated strat-
egy suggests that boutiques have the incentive to monitor management, but their limited assets
under management cast doubt on whether they will be influential. In the context of discretionary
investment decisions, I find evidence that boutiques oversee management by curbing myopia. Even
though boutiques are small, they still appear to be influencial. Empirical evidence suggests that
this influence comes, in part, from their expertise, which is heeded by other institutional investors.
I also examine whether boutique investors earn abnormal returns on their investments and provide
insights into the potential sources of those returns. More specifically, consistent with the notion
that boutiques have expertise and an information advantage, I find that boutiques earn abnormal
returns and that these returns are earned in part by exploiting information incremental to publicly
available information.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors are an important component of corporate governance oversight because
they represent a substantial majority of the equity market. Thus, institutions can potentially ex-
ert significant influence on firms. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ventures to say that, “the effectiveness and credibility of the entire corporate governance frame-
work and company oversight depend to a large extent on institutional owners” (OECD, 2015).
However, institutional investors are heterogeneous with respect to their incentives and ability to
exercise managerial oversight. A recent survey of asset managers by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center Institute revealed that engagement and oversight was either prioritized or ignored
- a bimodal distribution (Goldstein, 2011). Prior research also supports the notion that only particu-
lar types of institutions – such as activists, blockholders, and Bushee’s (2001) dedicated institutions
— play significant roles in corporate governance oversight (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hartzell
and Starks, 2003; An and Zhang, 2013; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).
One previously unexplored type of institutional investor is the equity boutique. Boutiques are
small institutions that specialize in asset management and implement a highly concentrated invest-
ment strategy. Boutiques’ influence on corporate governance is theoretically ambiguous. While
their concentrated and specialized investment strategy suggests that boutiques have the incentive
to monitor management, their small size calls into question whether they will be influential. In
this study, I investigate two research questions. First, do boutiques monitor management? I find
that boutiques contribute to managerial oversight in spite of their relatively small size. Second, do
boutiques earn abnormal returns? I find evidence that boutiques do earn abnormal returns, which
are driven in part by an information advantage.
The study of equity boutiques is important for several reasons. First, boutiques pursue a spe-
cialized investment strategy, and their focus on specific types of businesses, industries or geo-
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graphic regions may increase their ability to monitor and influence management. Compared to
non-boutiques that diversify their assets across an average of nearly 300 firms, boutiques focus
their investments in only 33 firms, on average. As a result, boutiques may have an expertise that
other institutions do not have. Second, boutiques’ presence in the equity market is increasing.
Since 2003, the number of boutiques grew over 170%, compared to growth in the number of in-
stitutions overall of 55%.1 In addition to increasing in absolute number, the number of boutiques
relative to the number of all institutional investors increased in relative amounts from 4.9% in 2003
to 8.5% in 2015. Third, ‘dedicated’ institutions as defined by Bushee (2001), which are generally
associated with improvements in corporate governance (e.g., Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; An
and Zhang, 2013), are on the decline in relative amounts.2 Boutiques may fill the monitoring gap
left by the decline in dedicated institutions.
Although boutiques’ concentrated investment strategy suggests that they are incentivized to
monitor management (Edmans and Manso, 2011; Fich et al., 2015), they are typically smaller
than other institutional investors which may restrict their influence over management (Huddart,
1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Compared to non-boutiques that hold an average of $5.4 billion
in assets under management, boutiques hold an average of $1.1 billion. These attributes lead to
conflicting theoretical predictions with respect to whether and how boutiques engage with man-
agement. In particular, an institution’s concentration drives its incentive to monitor management
(Edmans, 2009). The actions and outcomes of a single investment is of greater consequence in a
concentrated portfolio. Therefore, due to their concentrated investment strategy, boutiques should
have strong incentive to monitor. On the other hand, an institutions’ size drives its ability to mon-
itor through institutional voice (Huddart, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).3 According to this
theory, boutiques are unlikely to be influential due to their small size. Thus, whether boutiques
monitor management and exercise institutional voice is an empirical question.
1From 2003 to 2015, the number of boutique institutions increased from 110 to 295.
2In 2003, 4.3% of institutions followed a dedicated strategy, compared to 2.8% in 2015.
3Black (1992) defines institutional voice as exercising influence (but not control) over management.
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I test whether boutiques monitor management in the setting of discretionary investment deci-
sions. Management can reduce discretionary investment in order to meet short-term expectations
at the cost of long-term value. Bushee (1998) uses this setting to investigate whether institutional
investors curb managerial myopia. Contrary to his prediction, Bushee does not find conclusive
evidence that dedicated institutional investors curb managerial myopia.4 While boutiques’ strat-
egy differs from that of dedicated institutional investors, their monitoring incentives are similar.
If boutiques use institutional voice to curb managerial myopia, then I expect an increase in bou-
tique ownership to be associated with an increase in discretionary investment spending. Within a
propensity score matched sample, I find evidence of higher levels of research and development, ad-
vertising expense, plant, property, and equipment, and aggregate investment in the year following
net purchases by boutique institutional investors, even after controlling for dedicated institutional
investor ownership.5 This evidence suggests that boutiques contribute to a reduction in managerial
myopia.
The finding that boutique investment corresponds to reduced myopia is robust to several al-
ternative designs. First, the finding is robust to both the use of a continuous and dichotomous
measure of boutique purchases. Second, using a difference-in-difference design, years in which
firms have positive boutique ownership have higher levels of discretionary investment than those
firms without boutique ownership. Third, using a changes design, I find that the change in boutique
ownership in year t is associated with an increased change in discretionary investment in year t+1.
Lastly, a placebo test lends credibility to the design in that a change in boutique ownership in year
t is not associated with discretionary investment in year t-2, as expected.
Even though boutiques are small, they still appear to be influential. It is not obvious why man-
agers listen to boutiques’ institutional voice in spite of their size. One possible source of influence
4Bushee (1998) concludes that “extreme proportions of ownership by dedicated institutions... have no incremental
impact on the likelihood of R&D cuts,” but he caveats that “the limited number of cases in which dedicated institutions
own majority shares of firms” could reduce power.
5Consistent with the results of Bushee (1998), I find no significant association between dedicated ownership or dedi-
cated net purchases and discretionary investment.
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is boutiques’ expertise. If boutiques are considered experts among other institutional investors,
then management may be more apt to listen, because a sale by a boutique could have a ripple
effect in the market. Consistent with this prediction, I find that an increase (decrease) in boutique
ownership in quarter t is followed by an above (below) average change in non-boutique owner-
ship in quarter t+1 even after controlling for determinants of institutional ownership. Overall, the
evidence suggests that boutiques’ expertise may generate broader influence.
The broader implication of boutique ownership is the potential impact on firm value. Bou-
tiques’ expertise positions them to earn abnormal returns through several possible channels, in-
cluding improved corporate governance oversight and information advantages. First, while not all
corporate governance improvements increase firm value (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), boutiques are
uniquely positioned to influence corporate governance in a more tailored, firm-specific approach.
A tailored approach is more likely to enhance value than a ‘one size fits all’ approach (Coles et al.,
2008). Thus, boutiques’ influence on corporate governance is likely to be value-increasing.
An information advantage is a second channel through which boutiques’ expertise could in-
fluence value. Sophisticated investors use information advantages to earn abnormal returns. For
example, an information advantage could be based on public information that is not yet impounded
into price (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) or on private information (Maffett, 2012). Boutiques’
small and concentrated investment approach may provide them with an information advantage for
two reasons. First, boutiques’ expertise could lead to better use of accounting fundamentals thereby
enabling boutiques to more accurately identify when fundamentals are not yet reflected into price.
Alternatively, boutiques may use other information generated by their expertise. The limited num-
ber of investments could enable greater investment in expertise via the costly acquisition of private
information. These information advantage sources are not mutually exclusive.
Therefore, I predict that boutiques have a beneficial impact on firm value. I test whether bou-
tiques positively influence the value of their portfolio firms by examining whether portfolio firms
earn abnormal returns. To control for the riskiness of the boutiques’ portfolio, I use a five-factor
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asset pricing model. This model controls for market returns and commonly known risk factors and
generates a unique alpha (α) for each institutional investor (Fama and French, 2015). Alpha – the
portion of portfolio returns that is not explained by one of the five factors – is a measure of suc-
cess of the institutional investor. I find boutiques have positive and significant alphas, consistent
with boutiques implementing a successful investment strategy. I also find that, while boutiques
are no different in performance than activist investors or dedicated institutions, their alphas are
significantly larger than transient and quasi-index institutions. This evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that expertise and incentives play an important role in boutiques’ investment strategy
and, ultimately, value.
I next investigate whether boutiques are sophisticated users of financial information and have
an information advantage incremental to the use of firm fundamentals. I use Piotroski’s F-Score
to capture a firm’s fundamentals (Piotroski, 2000; Piotroski and So, 2012). If boutiques are so-
phisticated users of financial information, then I expect boutiques to trade on information in firm
fundamentals (Choi and Sias, 2012). Indeed, I find that boutique-owned firms have higher F-
Scores than non-boutique-owned firms. If boutiques have an information advantage incremental
to firm fundamentals, then I expect boutique-owned firms to generate higher abnormal returns,
holding constant the firms’ fundamentals. To test this prediction, I compare one-year buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of firms within the same F-Score Tier with and without boutique
ownership. For the low and medium F-Score tiers, the mean BHAR is significantly higher for
firms with boutique ownership than firms without. For firms with low to medium financial health,
boutiques distinguish winners and losers holding financial health constant. Overall, the evidence
is consistent with the prediction that boutiques have an information advantage.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this is the first study, to my knowledge, that
identifies boutique institutional investors as a distinct type of institution. The study of subsets of
institutions is important because institutions vary with respect to investment strategy, incentives,
and behavior. Classifications enable researchers to more precisely test predictions that apply only
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to institutions of a certain type. Descriptively, boutiques are distinct from activist, dedicated,
transient or quasi-index institutional investors in their size, concentration, number of investments
held, age, and several other attributes. Boutiques also behave differently from other classifications
in the multivariate analyses. Thus, future research may benefit from the inclusion of boutiques as
a distinct classification.
Second, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature that investigates the role of
institutional investors in managerial monitoring. Numerous studies analytically model and empir-
ically investigate the heterogeneous incentives of institutional investors. The study of boutiques’
corporate governance role is important because the theoretical predictions are conflicting. I find
that boutiques’ incentives outweigh any limitation due to their small size. Thus, boutiques appear
to be a type of institution that improves corporate governance. This finding is especially relevant
as the relative proportion of dedicated institutions – historically associated with improved corpo-
rate governance – is shrinking. Thus, for studies on the monitoring role of institutional investors,
boutiques are a relevant subset of institutions to study.
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature on how institutional investors earn abnormal re-
turns. In particular, several studies document empirical evidence that institutional investors lever-
age an information advantage to earn returns in excess of the market (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone,
2004; Maffett, 2012). The evidence suggests that boutiques enjoy an information advantage, pos-
sibly as a result of their expertise. Thus, the examination of expertise as a source of private infor-
mation is an opportunity for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines boutique institutions and discusses the
time-series trends that gave rise to the boutique institutional investor. My first research question
—do boutiques monitor management —is discussed and empirically tested in Section 3. My sec-
ond research question —do boutiques earn abnormal returns —is discussed and empirically tested
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2. BOUTIQUE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
This section introduces the boutique institutional investor. I define boutiques using business
press and industry research and discuss the relevance of boutiques in the context of the landscape
of institutional investors. Then, I discuss the sample selection and classification process followed
by descriptive statistics.
2.1 The Definition of Boutiques
While the word “boutique” is regularly used in the financial services industry to describe a
small and specialized business, there are different types of boutique financial firms. The focus of
this study is equity boutiques, also known as asset management boutiques. Two other commonly
discussed types of boutiques are advisory boutiques and boutique investment banks. Advisory
boutiques may focus on providing advice to clients on specialized topics such as mergers and
acquisitions. Boutique investment banks may focus on raising capital or restructuring. In contrast,
equity boutiques have an “exclusive commitment” to asset management (Coyle, 2009).1 Equity
boutiques are the focus of this study because they are the type of financial firm that are theoretically
likely to promote good corporate governance.
While there does not yet exist a universal technical definition of boutiques, two defining at-
tributes emerge from business press and industry research: size and specialization. Boutiques are
regularly described as “small”. Limited assets under management is a necessary condition for a
specialized investment strategy. In fact, boutique fund managers convey an intention of “staying
relatively small”, even if it could mean turning down potential customers to prevent excessive
growth (Comtios, 2015).
The second defining attribute of boutique institutions is specialization. Regularly described as
“specialized”, their approach to investing is “highly” or “narrowly focused” (Jacobius, 2011). This
1Appendix B summarizes quotes from a few of these sources that highlight the defining attributes of equity boutiques.
All quoted words and phrases can be found in context in the appendix.
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laser focus on a specialty can also be more technically described as the “concentration of their
portfolios” in classes, industries, or geographic regions (Oakley, 2014). Indeed, this “niche” style
of investing prompts Morningstar.com’s Investing Classroom to encourage diversification across
boutiques in order to reduce risk. Boutiques are also often described as “flexible” or “nimble”,
because they can make trades that large institutions cannot make (Comtios, 2015; McGrath, 2017;
RidgeWorth Investments, 2014). This flexibility enables boutiques to respond quickly to a chang-
ing market by moving funds in and out of stocks without moving the price.
Boutiques are conceptually different from other types of institutions studied in the literature
such as Bushee’s (2001) classifications of dedicated, transient, and quasi-index. Dedicated in-
stitutions are the largest of the three classifications and take large positions (often blockholder
positions) in a large number investments. This strategy stands in stark contrast to boutique institu-
tions that limit their number of investments to just a few firms and, because of their size, typically
do not take blockholder positions. Transient institutions are characterized by frequent turnover
of investments and earnings sensitivity. Boutiques, on the other hand, are not characterized by
their rate of turnover. And perhaps opposite of boutiques’ highly concentrated investment strategy,
quasi-Index institutions are highly diversified and infrequently turnover investments. Overall, it
appears that boutiques are a unique type of institutional investor.
To empirically investigate boutiques, I create a technical definition to reflect the three attributes
that emerge from the business press and industry research. The three criteria emphasized by busi-
ness press and industry research are (1) an exclusive commitment to asset management, (2) size,
and (3) specialization. I operationalize these criteria by focusing on institutional investors (1)
whose only purpose is the investment of assets under management in common stock (excluding
exchange-traded funds), (2) who invest less than $100 billion in assets under management, and (3)
whose portfolio concentration is in the top tercile.2 This classification process is described in detail
2The restriction set at $100 billion is based on anecdotal mentions of what constitutes a ‘large’ institutional investor.
The results are robust to using a much tighter restriction, such as $50 billion.
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in Section 2.3.
2.2 The Relevance of Boutiques
The landscape of institutional investors and their investment strategies evolved significantly
over the last two decades (Celik and Isaksson, 2013). Investment strategies, holding periods, the
investment chain, and institution types have all seen change. This changing environment gave way
for the rise of the boutique institutional investor. Average holding periods, a key component of in-
vestment strategies, declined globally over the past 20 years (Goldstein, 2011). A study conducted
by the Committee for Economic Development reports that the average holding period across all
institutional investors is now less than one year (Heineman and Davis, 2011). Another relevant
change in investment strategies is the lengthening of the investment chain, giving rise to additional
agency problems. Historically, the shareholder base was comprised of individuals and institutions
that directly bridge individuals to investee firms. Now, fewer individuals invest directly and more
institutional investors invest in one another or exchange traded funds. This results in a longer path,
on average, between the investee firm and the shareholder. The lengthening of the investment
chain diminishes the incentive to oversee the ultimate investee firms. The prevalence of passive
investment is on the rise (Goldstein, 2011, p. 46-47), driven by the longer investment chain and
the tendency to invest in an index. Boutique institutional investors, however, maintain a shorter
investment chain on average than non-boutique institutions, because boutiques do not invest in the
portfolios of other institutions. Therefore, while additional agency problems can arise for insti-
tutions with long investment chains (Ahrens et al., 2011), the path from agent to principal in the
boutique setting is more direct.
Not only are investment strategies evolving, but the types of institutional investors are expand-
ing. Assets under management by private equity increased more than seven-fold from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s (Cumming, 2011). In the same window of time, assets under management
by hedge funds increased three-fold (Stowell, 2010). As the largest institutional investors contin-
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ued to get even larger, an opportunity for smaller and more agile institutional investors emerged
(Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007): Boutiques fill this void. Boutiques are limited in size in order to
develop expertise in a narrow area and be agile and responsive to a changing market.
The emergence of boutiques is apparent in the data. Figure 2.2 graphs the growth of insti-
tutional investors by type based on 2003 numbers.3 From 2003 to 2015 the number of boutique
institutional investors grew 171%, which is over three times the growth rate in the entire popula-
tion (54.7%).4 The three well-known classifications of institutional investors established by Bushee
(1998, 2001) show growth patterns more similar to that in the total population: 41.8%, 56.8%, and
62.0% for Dedicated, Quasi-Index, and Transient institutions, respectively.5 In addition to growth
in number, the relative proportion of boutiques in the population of institutions is growing over
time. In 2003, boutiques only made up 4.9% of the population. In 2015, boutiques now make up
8.5% of the population.
Overall, detailed observation of institutional investors across a long time series reveals gradual
yet dramatic changes. Such dramatic changes elicit re-examination of the types of institutional
investors. Whether boutiques emerge as a unique type of institution is an empirical question.
2.3 Classification of Boutiques
The sample selection and classification process is summarized in Table 2.1. I begin with all
13F filings from Thomson-Reuters. In my sample period, 2003-2015, there are 156,243 unique
manager-quarter observations for 5,726 distinct managers.6 I require at least 4 investments and at
least 8 quarters of data, similar to Bushee (2001), resulting in 123,644 quarters for 4,828 managers.
Four restrictions are made on the data to identify those manager-quarters that exhibit the at-
tributes of an equity boutique. First, I restrict giant institutions (AUM > $100 billion). This
3This growth pattern is robust to choosing a different base year. 2003 is the first year in my sample period.
4In 2003, 2,127 distinct institutions filed 13Fs with the SEC. In 2015, this number was 3,291.
5The growth in the overall population is 55%, therefore dedicated institutions are growing at a rate slower than the
population.
6For classification purposes, I use data beginning in 1999 in order to have 5 years of historical data. For analysis, the
sample period 2003-2015 is used throughout the paper.
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Table 2.1: Sample Selection
Panel A: Sample Selection
Observations Mgrnos
Distinct Observations/Mgrnos from 2003-2015 156,243 5,726
Less: Institutions with less than 4 investments (9,655) (356)
Less: Institutions with less than 8 quarters of data (22,944) (542)
Classifiable observations 123,644 4,828
Less: AUM greater than $100 Billion (1,030) (9)
Less: Greater than 5% AUM invested in ETFs (41,739) (612)
Retain Only: Institution Types“INV” or “IIA” (17,087) (825)
Retain Only: Top Tercile of Concentration (42426) (1410)
Observation meeting boutique criteria 21,542 1,987
Less: Rolling 5-year Average less than 75% (6,190) (925)
BoutiqueQ = 1 15,352 1,062
Panel B: Classification of Boutique
Observations Mgrnos
BoutiqueQ = 1 15,352 1,062
Less: Missing Data (60) (11)
Less: Institutions that oscillate between Boutique and Non-Boutique (2,801) (185)
Less: Institutions that leave boutique classification (3,076) (286)
Less: Institutions that join boutique classification (1,847) (124)
Institutions that are always boutique: Boutique = 1 7,568 456
This table summarizes the classification process of boutique institutional investors.
11
Figure 2.1: Growth of Number of Institution by Type.
This graph presents the growth of institutional investors from 2003 to 2015 by institution type.
Growth is scaled by 2003 levels. Bushee permanent classifications can be obtained from Brian
Bushee’s website. The classification of boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3
restriction is not binding - none of the observations or managers eliminated at this stage meet all
three other restrictions. This result is unsurprising, as the boutique investment strategy (special-
ized and concentrated investments) requires limited assets. Secondly, I retain only institutions that
invest at least 95% of their assets in common stock, not exchange traded funds (ETFs).7 In order to
capture the correct kind of financial businesses, I restrict the sample to institutions classified as an
investment company (“INV”) or independent investment advisor (“IIA”), as coded by Brian Bushee
on his website.8 This step will eliminate financial business such as investment banks, insurance
companies, or pension funds from the boutique classification.
7A list of all exchange traded funds is available online. Using these online sources, ETFs are manually coded as such
based on the asset name and ticker.
8http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIvars.html is accessed in July of 2017.
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Third, I capture highly specialized, niche investment strategies with a measure of internal con-
centration. Internal concentration is distinct from external concentration - a measure used by
Bushee (2001) and others. Internal concentration is a measure of how concentrated an institu-
tion’s holdings are with respect to their portfolio of holdings. External concentration is a measure
of how concentrated an institution’s holdings are with respect to the common shares outstanding
of the firm in which they are investing. According to external concentration, an investment of 5%
of common shares outstanding is more concentrated than an investment of 1% of common shares
outstanding. According to internal concentration, an investment that is 5% of the institution’s port-
folio is more concentrated than an investment that is 1% of the portfolio, irrespective of the size of
the investment with respect to common shares outstanding. Internal concentration is a measure of
how important each individual investment is to the institution. Internal concentration is measured
as Σ[(pricei ∗ sharesi)2]/(AUM)2, where pricei is the price per share of firm i, sharesi is the
number of shares the institution owns of firm i, and AUM is the institution’s assets under manage-
ment.9 I restrict the sample to the top tercile of concentration, resulting in 21,542 quarters (1,987
managers) that meet the boutique criteria.
Lastly, to ensure the boutique classification is a representation of the institution at that point in
time (and not a temporary oscillation), I compute the percentage of quarters in the previous 5 years
(20 quarters) that qualify as boutique.10 Quarterly observations are classified as BoutiqueQ if at
least 75% of the previous quarters qualify as boutique. This results in 1,062 institutions that are
classified as BoutiqueQ at some point in the sample period.
Parallel to Bushee’s permanent classification of transient, quasi-index, and dedicated institu-
tions, I create a permanent classification of boutique institutional investors. The classification
Boutique is saved for those institutions that are always classified as BoutiqueQ in the sample
9External concentration is measured as ln(Σ[(sharesi/cshoi)2]) where sharesi is the number of shares the institution
owns of firm i and cshoi is the common shares outstanding of firm i.
10All results in the paper are similar to the use of a 3 year rolling window instead of 5 year rolling window. For
institutions that are only 3 or 4 years old, I compute the percentage of quarters in the life of the institution that
qualify as boutique. All results in the paper are similar if I require all 5 years.
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period. Under this classification, 456 boutiques are permanently classified as boutique. The per-
manent classification has several advantages over the quarterly refreshed classification of bou-
tique. First, this classification eliminates the 185 institutions that oscillate between boutique and
non-boutique more than one time. It is unlikely that a institution frequently shift its type, thus a
permanent classification scheme reduces this noise. Secondly, it allows the computation of changes
in holdings by boutique institutions. If an institution changes classifications between years, then a
measure of change in holdings by boutique institutions is unreliable - the change could simply be
a result of new classifications. therefore, throughout the paper, I rely on Boutique as my primary
classification of boutique institutional investors.
2.4 The Uniqueness of Boutiques
A relevant concern when classifying institutions as boutiques is whether these boutique insti-
tutions fundamentally differ from the established classifications in the literature. In this section, I
summarize how boutiques differ from other types of institutions using descriptive statistics. Figure
2.1 is a bar graph of the number of boutique institutions over time and by Bushee (2001) classifica-
tion. In 2003, there are 102 boutique institutions, of which 19 are dedicated, 21 are transient, and
47 are quasi-index. The remaining 15 are unclassified. In 2015, there are 276 boutique institutions,
of which 34 are dedicated, 87 are transient, 141 are quasi-index, and 14 are unclassified. The pro-
portions of dedicated, quasi-index, and transient institutions that also qualify as boutique remain
relatively constant over time. Additionally, of the 282 managers classified as an activist institu-
tional investor, only 54 are also classified as boutique. This data conveys that boutique institutions
are not a subset or superset of one of the other well-known institutional investor classifications.
To understand descriptive differences across groups, I tabulate a variety of institution and port-
folio characteristics by classification in Table 2.2. I compare the boutique mean (median) to the
means (medians) of the other classifications using a two-tailed, unpaired t-test (a nonparametric
equality-of-medians test). It is not apparent, ex ante, whether boutiques will be significantly dif-
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Figure 2.2: Boutique Institutions Over Time and by Type.
This graph presents the number of boutique institutional investors on December 31 of each year
from 2003 to 2015. The boutiques in each year are then subdivided by Bushee classification:
dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and other (unclassified). Bushee classifications can be obtained
from Brian Bushee’s website. The classification of boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3.
ferent than other types of institutions on average, because boutiques overlap with all established
categories of institutional investors. To make clean inferences, the dedicated, transient, quasi-
index, and activist samples exclude any boutique institutions.11 For more detail on the distribution
of variables, Table 2.3 reports the distribution statistics (including first and third quartile) for bou-
tique institution (Panel A) and all institutions (Panel B).
11Inferences remain the same to the inclusion of boutique institutions in the remaining categories.
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Table 2.2: Institutions’ Characteristics
Boutique Dedicated Transient Quasi-Index Activists
mean median stdev mean median stdev mean median stdev mean median stdev mean median stdev
Assets Under Management 1,142 301 (2,858) 10,123∗∗∗ 1,470∗∗∗ (19,649) 2,802∗∗∗ 528∗∗∗ (8,252) 4,138∗∗∗ 402∗∗∗ (12,687) 5,843∗∗∗ 1,086∗∗∗ (14,579)
Concentration 0.131 0.095 (0.099) 0.145∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ (0.063) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ (0.075)
Number of Investees 33.5 21.0 (61.7) 171.4∗∗∗ 46.0∗∗∗ (407.8) 260.0∗∗∗ 93.0∗∗∗ (468.7) 300.1∗∗∗ 114.0∗∗∗ (546.2) 270.2∗∗∗ 78.0∗∗∗ (544.0)
Institutional Owner’s Age 7.114 5.751 (4.909) 13.414∗∗∗ 14.008∗∗∗ (6.485) 8.968∗∗∗ 7.507∗∗∗ (5.703) 11.173∗∗∗ 10.759∗∗∗ (6.189) 11.095∗∗∗ 10.504∗∗∗ (6.351)
Stability of Holdings 0.493 0.503 (0.302) 0.624∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ (0.277) 0.292∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ (0.253) 0.719∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ (0.206) 0.450∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ (0.299)
Portfolio Turnover 0.116 0.101 (0.070) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ (0.061) 0.159∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ (0.074)
Average Holding Period (Yrs) 2.161 1.802 (1.429) 2.862∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ (1.540) 1.337∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ (0.883) 3.573∗∗∗ 3.252∗∗∗ (1.744) 2.111∗ 1.703∗∗∗ (1.500)
Avg. Holding Period / IO Age 0.383 0.342 (0.226) 0.267∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ (0.184) 0.202∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.401∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ (0.209) 0.239∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ (0.173)
Average Pct Holdings 0.030 0.012 (0.041) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ (0.031)
Pct Held in Large Blocks 0.183 0.000 (0.269) 0.502∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ (0.278) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.170∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ (0.205)
AUM / Number of Investees 39.63 13.88 (61.93) 87.66∗∗∗ 34.00∗∗∗ (97.65) 14.36∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗ (29.58) 14.26∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ (33.75) 37.24∗ 11.01∗∗∗ (62.79)
Herfindahl Concentration -5.680 -5.327 (3.101) -1.772∗∗∗ -1.477∗∗∗ (2.062) -6.143∗∗∗ -5.676∗∗∗ (3.161) -7.112∗∗∗ -7.072∗∗∗ (3.512) -3.630∗∗∗ -3.162∗∗∗ (2.538)
FF48 Industry Concentration 0.273 0.216 (0.174) 0.300∗∗∗ 0.228∗ (0.219) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ (0.151) 0.141∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ (0.136) 0.208∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ (0.161)
Portfolio BHAR 0.005 0.004 (0.059) 0.003∗ 0.003 (0.058) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003 (0.041) 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.004 0.003 (0.045)
Porfolio Avg Assets 6.713 6.708 (2.219) 6.420∗∗∗ 6.470∗∗ (2.313) 6.777∗ 6.931∗∗∗ (1.948) 7.910∗∗∗ 8.180∗∗∗ (1.863) 6.528∗∗∗ 6.674 (1.922)
Porfolio Avg MTB 3.322 2.469 (4.313) 2.706∗∗∗ 1.932∗∗∗ (3.917) 3.318 2.634∗∗∗ (3.874) 3.625∗∗∗ 3.004∗∗∗ (3.598) 2.933∗∗∗ 2.270∗∗∗ (3.836)
Porfolio Avg Growth 0.082 0.071 (0.094) 0.078 0.066∗∗ (0.092) 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ (0.077) 0.065∗∗∗ 0.071 (0.061) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072 (0.077)
Porfolio Avg Firm Age 19.332 17.154 (11.365) 18.779∗ 16.280∗ (12.404) 21.211∗∗∗ 20.305∗∗∗ (9.038) 31.098∗∗∗ 31.632∗∗∗ (10.573) 20.205∗∗∗ 19.321∗∗∗ (8.674)
Institution-Quarter Observations 7,568 2.590 36,634 73,317 7,194
This table reports the means (medians) and standard deviations of all types of institutional owners: boutiques, dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and
activist. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Dedicated, transient, and quasi-index classifications are made available by Brian Bushee. Activists
are those institutions that have initiated a shareholder proposal. The classification of boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3. The stars on the
mean values for dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and activist correspond to the p-value of an unpaired two-sample t-test between boutiques and
the respective type. The stars on the median values for dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and activist correspond to the p-value of a non-parametric
equality-of-medians test between boutiques and the respective type. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and
99. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to a p-value less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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4,828 institutional investors in my sample period from 2003 to 2015 are classifiable, and 456
of these are permanent boutiques (see Table 2.1).12 Of the remaining non-boutique institutions, 85,
1,580, 2,414, and 228 are permanently classified as dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and activist,
respectively.13
Boutiques’ defining attributes stand out as different from the remaining classifications. Bou-
tiques are smaller than all other types. While mean assets under management is $1.14 billion, the
median is only $301 million: most boutiques manage less than a billion in assets. This value is
considerably smaller than all other types, especially dedicated institutions which manage a mean of
$10 billion (median of $1.5 billion), on average. Boutiques are also generally more internally con-
centrated. Compared to transient, quasi-index, and activist institutions, boutiques are significantly
more concentrated. While dedicated institutions are more internally concentrated, on average, this
difference is driven by investment banks (which are, by definition, not equity boutiques.) When
comparing boutiques only to dedicated independent investment advisors or investment companies,
boutiques are more concentrated. The concentrated investment strategy adopted by boutique in-
stitutions results in fewer investments. Boutiques, invest in only 33 (21) companies on average
(median), while dedicated invest in 175 (46) and activists invest in 280 (78) , on average (median).
Consistent with the notion that boutiques have grown in prominence over the last two decades,
the average age of boutique institutions is significantly lower than that of dedicated, transient, and
quasi-index institutions. Boutiques have a mean (median) age only 7.1 (5.8) years, in contrast to
all other classifications that have a mean (median) age of 10.2 (9.3) years old.
Since boutique institutions invest only in a few chosen firms, my ex ante expectation is that
boutiques have lower turnover and longer holding periods than institutions on average. Along
these dimensions, boutiques stand out as being different from transient. Boutiques have more
stable holding periods (especially after adjusting for age) and have less turnover than transient
12Only 4,494 of these institutional investors are classified by Brian Bushee.
13As defined by Brian Bushee on his website, these classifications are permanent and do not change over time.
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Table 2.3: Boutique Institution Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Boutique Institutional Investors
N Mean σ 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Assets Under Management 7,568 1,142 2,858 135 301 821
Concentration 7,568 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.16
Number of Investees 7,568 33 62 13 21 33
Institutional Owner’s Age 7,568 7.11 4.91 3.25 5.75 9.50
Stability of Holdings 7,568 0.49 0.30 0.23 0.50 0.75
Portfolio Turnover 7,144 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15
Average Holding Period (Yrs) 7,568 2.16 1.43 1.16 1.80 2.77
Avg. Holding Period / IO Age 7,568 0.38 0.23 0.20 0.34 0.53
Average Pct Holdings 7,568 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04
Pct Held in Large Blocks 7,568 0.18 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.32
AUM / Number of Investees 7,568 39.63 61.93 5.62 13.88 41.84
Herfindahl Concentration 7,568 -5.68 3.10 -7.56 -5.33 -3.37
FF48 Industry Concentration 7,568 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.34
Portfolio BHAR 7,568 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.04
Porfolio Avg Assets 7,568 6.71 2.22 5.20 6.71 8.38
Porfolio Avg MTB 7,568 3.32 4.31 1.38 2.47 4.05
Porfolio Avg Growth 7,566 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.13
Porfolio Avg Firm Age 7,568 19.33 11.37 10.60 17.15 25.58
Panel B: All Institutional Investors
Assets Under Management 123,824 3,623 11,351 163 419 1,685
Concentration 123,824 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05
Number of Investees 123,824 267 506 48 98 224
Institutional Owner’s Age 123,824 10.23 6.13 4.76 9.25 14.76
Stability of Holdings 123,824 0.57 0.30 0.33 0.65 0.83
Portfolio Turnover 118,854 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.14
Average Holding Period (Yrs) 123,824 2.77 1.82 1.35 2.36 3.81
Avg. Holding Period / IO Age 123,824 0.34 0.22 0.17 0.29 0.47
Average Pct Holdings 123,824 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
Pct Held in Large Blocks 123,824 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.02
AUM / Number of Investees 123,824 17.20 39.19 1.90 4.35 13.10
Herfindahl Concentration 123,824 -6.67 3.49 -9.16 -6.42 -4.03
FF48 Industry Concentration 123,824 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.19
Portfolio BHAR 123,824 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02
Porfolio Avg Assets 123,824 7.45 2.01 6.25 7.74 8.90
Porfolio Avg MTB 123,824 3.49 3.74 1.92 2.87 3.90
Porfolio Avg Growth 123,822 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.11
Porfolio Avg Firm Age 123,824 27.03 11.44 18.11 26.89 35.37
Panel A (Panel B) reports descriptive statistics of boutique (all) institutional investors. All variables are
defined in Appendix A. Dedicated, transient, and quasi-index classifications are made available by Brian
Bushee. Activists are those institutions that have initiated a shareholder proposal. The classification of
boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. Continuous variables
are winsorized at 1 and 99.
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institutions.
Unlike dedicated institutions, boutiques do not take large positions in their investments. Dedi-
cated institutions hold, on average, 8.6% (median 7.9%) of the common stock of their investments.
Consequently, 50% (median 55%) of dedicated holdings are held in blockholder positions (greater
than 5% of common shares outstanding owned). This is in sharp contrast to boutique institutions
that hold, on average, 3.0% (median 1.2%) of the common stock of their investments and only 18%
(median 0%) of their positions are blockholder positions. Unsurprisingly, boutiques are much less
externally concentrated than dedicated institutions.
An insight into boutiques’ investment strategy emerges from its FF48 industry concentration.
I calculate the Herfindahl concentration index for each institutional investor with respect to the
amount of assets invested in each Fama French 48 industry classification. I find that boutique in-
stitutional investors’ investments are highly concentrated with respect to industry, more so than
transient, quasi-index or activist investors. Descriptively, it appears that boutique institutions are
pursuing an industry expertise strategy. Given the industry concentration of boutique institutions,
it is relevant to ask whether boutiques could be characterized by specializing in particular indus-
tries such as technology. To investigate whether this is the case, I identify the industry for each
institution in which the largest percentage of their assets are held. Then, I observe the distribution
of industries. While institutions tend to cluster around particular industries, boutiques and non-
boutiques cluster with the same patterns. Thus, I do not believe boutiques can be said to cluster in
a particular industry any more than another type of institutional investor.
Boutique institutions also exhibit different survivorship rates than other institutional investors.
Table 2.4 reports the attrition of boutiques and other institutions. In the total population, the at-
trition rate spans 4% to 7%. In the sample of boutiques only, attrition is higher — between 5%
and 15% each year. Boutiques’ lower rates of survival could be a consequence of their high-risk
strategy (concentrating investments in a small number of firms and industries). This observation
is particularly relevant when assessing the portfolio performance of boutique institutions. If bou-
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Table 2.4: Survivorship
All Institutions Boutique Institutions
Year Beginning Count Departed Attrition Rate Beginning Count Departed Attrition Rate
2003 1,733 108 0.062 85 11 0.129
2004 1,687 71 0.042 79 13 0.165
2005 1,835 81 0.044 75 4 0.053
2006 1,956 91 0.047 85 8 0.094
2007 2,111 89 0.042 112 7 0.063
2008 2,287 120 0.052 138 10 0.072
2009 2,415 172 0.071 156 23 0.147
2010 2,499 155 0.062 151 20 0.132
2011 2,506 130 0.052 150 11 0.073
2012 2,580 125 0.048 172 14 0.081
2013 2,709 135 0.050 191 23 0.120
2014 2,811 137 0.049 190 10 0.053
2015 2,956 178 0.060 231 19 0.082
This table reports the attrition rates for all institutional investors and boutique institutional investors for
the sample period of 2003 to 2015. The classification of boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3.
The beginning count is the number of distinct institutional investors (boutiques) are in the sample at the
beginning of the year. Departed is the number of distinct institutional investors (boutiques) that were in
the sample at the beginning of the year but are not in the sample at the end of the year. The attrition rate
is the departed count divided by the beginning count.
tiques had a lower attrition rate, then there could be concerns that my market return analyses is
upwardly biased. In fact, I find the opposite. Boutiques have a higher attrition rate than other
institution types, which provides some assurance that my results will not be upwardly biased.
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3. BOUTIQUES AND MANAGERIAL MYOPIA
3.1 Hypothesis Development
Monitoring by institutional investors is one component of the corporate governance framework.
Institutions provide a potential monitoring benefit that individual equity holders cannot provide
because of their size and economies of scale (Coffee, 1991; Black, 1992). Additionally, institutions
are themselves agents, and monitoring management is part of their fiduciary obligation to the
individuals that provide assets for investment. In an era where regulation of institutional investors
was in question, early research examined whether institutional monitoring is beneficial. Black and
Coffee (1994) study less-regulated Britain and conclude that deregulating institutional investors
and allowing them to engage in corporate governance is, on average, beneficial.
The literature thus evolved to study subgroups of institutional investors to further understand
which institutions provide monitoring benefits. Bushee (2001) classified institutions into three
categories–dedicated, transient, and quasi-index–based on their attributes and investment charac-
teristics. These classifications are regularly used in the accounting literature to further examine
the different roles institutions play in the equity market and to test predictions that apply only
to institutions of a certain type. Due to their large holdings and less transient positions, dedi-
cated institutions are expected to monitor and engage management to improve portfolio returns
instead of sell. Consistent with this expectation, An and Zhang (2013) find that dedicated institu-
tions decrease crash risk because management is less able to accumulate bad news without market
disclosure, and Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find that ownership by dedicated institutions is
associated with accounting conservatism. The diversification strategy of quasi-indexers, however,
impedes close monitoring of management and increases dependence on firm disclosures (Bushee
and Noe, 2000). Transient institutions hold short-term investments in many assets and are sensitive
to earnings news. Consequently, Bushee (1998) finds that transient institutions place short-term
21
pressures on management.
The notion that only certain types of institutions are engaged in corporate governance oversight
is validated by a recent survey of asset managers conducted by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center Institute that revealed that intervention with investee firms is either a priority or ignored —
a bimodal distribution (Goldstein, 2011). This finding resonates with theories that predict that
institutions choose either an intervention strategy or rely on threat of exit based on their attributes
(Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011).
An active strategy engages management to influence change. Also known as institutional
‘voice’, intervention is not micro-management, but instead engaging on issues that trickle down
into firm performance, such as executive compensation or policy changes (Black, 1992). For ex-
ample, the academic literature finds evidence of institutional oversight of executive compensation
structures, investment, and mergers and acquisitions (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Bushee, 1998;
Chen et al., 2007). In practice, the responsibility of corporate governance oversight bestowed upon
all shareholders is shouldered by institutional owners who engage management. For example, “Say
on Pay” (Section 951 of Dodd-Frank) requires shareholders to approve executive pay once every
three years. In addition, firms are voting on proxy access at an exponential rate. Proxy access
would provide large shareholders the opportunity to nominate an individual of their choosing to
the board of directors.
On the other hand, not all institutions are able or incentivized to govern through intervention
and instead rely on a more implicit signal. Colloquially coined as the “Wall Street Rule”, insti-
tutions implicitly share their feedback with management by buying or selling shares. Trading is
a low cost alternative to intervention when the institution is unhappy with management behavior.
Theory suggests that trading or the mere threat of exit can curb managerial opportunism (Edmans,
2009). However, Parrino et al. (2003) find weak evidence of institutions “voting with their feet"
and conclude the evidence is more consistent with institutions selling shares following poor per-
formance.
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An institutional investor chooses a governance strategy based on its effectiveness and its net
benefit. An institution’s motivation to govern through intervention or an institution’s inclination to
trade is a function of the attributes of that institution. An institution’s size and concentration are
particularly predictive of the governance strategy it will choose.
The concentration of an institutional investor’s portfolio drives the institution’s incentive to
monitor through ‘voice’. Institutional investors with diversified strategies have limited incentives
to monitor if they believe other firms are doing the job for them: a free rider problem. Therefore,
institutional investors with diversified strategies will favor trading, while institutions with concen-
trated strategies will favor intervention (Edmans and Manso, 2011). In addition, the concentration
of an institutional investor’s portfolio should promote the development of expertise.
The size of an institutional investor’s portfolio—the size of their position and assets under
management—drives the institutions ability to monitor through ‘voice’. Large institutional in-
vestors will favor an intervention strategy while small institutional investors will take a passive
role (Huddart, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Dedicated institutions are the largest with respect
to assets under management and most frequently hold blockholder positions, consistent with their
tendency to engage management as opposed to ‘voting with their feet’.
Whether boutique institutional investors monitor management is an empirical question. Due to
their unique characteristics of being small in size but concentrated in investment strategy, the gov-
ernance strategy boutiques will engage in is ambiguous. Boutiques’ incentives and ability appear
to be at odds. Boutiques have strong incentives to monitor their investee firms via intervention
because they invest in a limited number of firms and maintain concentrated portfolios. The in-
terquartile range of number of investments held by boutiques is only 13 to 33 firms, and these
investments are often concentrated within industry. Thus, boutiques are poised to have expertise
that improves their monitoring skill. Unlike large institutions that resort to boilerplate recommen-
dations, boutiques can tailor their recommendations to the few firms in which they invest. On the
other hand, due to their small size, it is not clear whether a boutique institutional investor’s voice
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will be heard, especially if their ownership stake is small. Trading is a feasible course of action for
boutiques, but the sale of a particular investment could dramatically change a boutiques’ portfolio.
I test whether boutique institutional investors engage in an active governance strategy in the
context of discretionary investment expenditures. This setting was used by Bushee (1998) to test
whether institutional investors curb or encourage myopic investment behavior. While Bushee doc-
uments that high transient ownership increases myopia, he finds no evidence that dedicated institu-
tions curb myopia in this context. This no-result finding is counterintuitive because the theory un-
ambiguously predicts that dedicated institutions are superior monitors. Thus, I revisit this puzzling
finding while looking at both dedicated and boutique institutions. Theory suggests that boutiques
are incentivized to monitor and engage management. Boutiques and dedicated institutions, how-
ever, vary greatly in both investment strategy and institution characteristics. Dedicated institutions
are often blockholders and take larger positions in their investee firms. Boutique institutions, how-
ever, take smaller positions, on average. In addition, dedicated institutions invest in many more
firms than boutique institutions (mean of 171 versus 33). Boutiques’ limited investments may en-
able them to generate expertise for monitoring. These differences, therefore, may enable boutiques
to curb managerial myopia in a way that dedicated institutions were unable.
The boutiques’ concentrated investment strategy coupled with their ability to monitor predicts
an active role in curbing managerial myopia. If boutiques take an active role, I expect boutiques to
be associated with a reduction in managerial myopia (an increase in firm investment). On the other
hand, the small size of boutiques predicts a more passive role. If boutiques take this passive role, I
expect no association. Therefore, due to their unique composition of attributes, whether boutiques
curb managerial myopia is an empirical question. I state my hypothesis in the alternative:
Hypothesis 1. Boutique institutional investors curb managerial myopia.
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3.2 Research Design
Managerial myopia occurs when managers succumb to short-term pressures at the expense of
long-term value. I capture the short-term orientation of management by looking at discretionary
investment expenditures. I consider three discretionary expenses and two holistic measures of in-
vestment — research and development, advertising expense, and capital expenditure, the sum these
three discretionary expense accounts and gross fixed assets. These three discretionary expenditure
accounts share two important attributes. First, management can reduce spending in these areas
in order to meet short term earnings expectations. Both R&D and advertising are expensed im-
mediately under U.S. GAAP. Capital expenditure is not expensed, but does increase depreciation
and interest expense (if purchased in part with debt); therefore, capital expenditure does have a
flow-through effect on earnings. Second, these three accounts directly impact the firm’s ability
to generate long-term value. A reduction in research and development today will flow through
to a reduction in value-adding innovation in the future (Bhojraj et al., 2009). Similarly, a reduc-
tion in advertising expenditure today will flow through to fewer sales in future periods. Lastly,
management potentially loses out on long-term investment opportunities by constraining capital
expenditure.
To test Hypothesis 1, I use the two following Tobit models at the firm-year level:
yi,t =β1BoutiqueF irmi,t−1 + β2BoutiqueBuyi,t−1 + β3DedicatedF irmi,t−1
+ β4DedicatedBuyi,t−1 + β5yi,t−1 +X ′i,t−1Λ + γff48 + αt + i,t
(3.1)
yi,t =β1BoutiqueOwnershipi,t−1 + β2∆BoutiqueOwnershipi,t−1
+ β3DedicatedOwnershipi,t−1 + β4∆DedicatedOwnershipi,t−1
+ β5yi,t−1 +X ′i,t−1Λ + γff48 + αt + i,t
(3.2)
The measures of investment, yi,t, include research and development (R&D), the sum of R&D
and advertising expenditure (RDAE), capital expenditure (capex), all three combined (aggregate),
and plant, property, and equipment (PPE). Each of these measures are scaled by total assets in
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year t. I use a Tobit model in each analysis due to the censoring of the data at zero.1 In Equation
3.1, BoutiqueBuyi,t−1 is a dichotomous variable equal to one if boutique institutions were net
purchasers of firm i’s stock in year t-1, and zero otherwise. If boutique institutional investors are
effectively monitoring management, then as boutique ownership in the firm increases, I predict
management will forfeit the short-term benefits in exchange for the long-run gains (β2 > 0).2
An important design feature in my analyses is the inclusion of a dichotomous variable for
net purchases by dedicated institutions (excluding boutiques) that parallels BoutiqueBuy. The
role of dedicated institutional investors in managerial oversight is well accepted by the literature.
Therefore, it is imperative that any findings on boutique institutional ownership is incremental to
any effect of dedicated institutions.
As an alternate design, I replace the dichotomous measures of boutique and dedicated owner-
ship and purchases with continuous measures in Equation 3.2. Specifically, Boutique (Dedicated)
Ownership is the percent of common stock outstanding owned by Boutique (Dedicated) institu-
tions, and ∆ Boutique (Dedicated) Ownership is the change in ownership by Boutique (Dedicated)
institutions. Continuous variables have the advantage of variation. As ∆ Boutique Ownership gets
larger, boutiques’ incremental influence on management should be greater. However, a disadvan-
tage of continuous variables is that they are not normally distributed. Both Boutique Ownership
and ∆ Boutique Ownership have a high proportion of zeros due to the number of firms that do not
have any boutique ownership. Thus, I maintain the dichotomous specification as my main analysis.
I include in both analyses a vector of control variables, Xi,t−1, that are known predictors of
investment (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Edmans et al., 2017; Biddle et al., 2009). I include
variables that capture a firm’s investment opportunities, investment ability, and historical invest-
1RD and RDAE have a large number of zeros and while capex and ppe are less frequently reported at zero, these
distributions are highly left skewed and have a discontinuously large number of zeros. as a result of censoring, this
the Tobit model is appropriate.
2The coefficient of interest is β2 instead of β1, because a positive association between boutique ownership and discre-
tionary investment may just inform us on the types of firms boutique invest in. However, if net purchases by boutiques
in year t-1 is followed by an increase in discretionary investment in year t, then it lends credence to the conclusion
that boutique ownership changes managements’ behavior.
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ment patterns.3 Specifically, a firm’s size (ln(assets)), value (Tobin’s Q), age (ln(age+1)) and equity
risk (standard deviation of daily excess returns over the fiscal year) all influence a firm’s investment
strategy. To capture financing ability, I rely on book value of cash, leverage, cash flow from opera-
tions, retained earnings (each scaled by total assets) and return on assets. To control for historical
investment patterns I include lagged investment, asset growth, the standard deviation of ROA, the
standard deviation of capital expenditure, and market to book. Lastly, I control for both prior year’s
returns and the percentage of common stock owned by institutional investors.
An econometric concern is that boutiques choose to invest in firms that fundamentally differ
from firms that boutiques choose not to invest in. Indeed, as seen in Panel A of Table 3.1, firm-
years in which boutiques are and are not net purchasers differ across multiple observable attributes.
These differences in observables suggest that the relation between BoutiqueBuy and investment
may be misspecified due to differences in likelihoods a given observation will be invested in by a
boutique institutional investor. This misspecified functional form could induce bias in the model.
Therefore, I create a propensity score matched sample in order to limit the sample to observations
with common support (Shipman et al., 2016). A propensity score matched (PSM) sample allows
me to restrict the control group to those observations that provide a reasonable counterfactual to
the treatment group. Institutional investors will select firms to invest in using observable firm
characteristics from the financial statements and stock market. The prediction model, therefore,
contains the lagged values of institutional ownership, cash, retained earnings, return on assets, cash
flow from operations, Tobin’s Q, firm size, firm age, risk, returns, and market to book. Institutional
investors will also select firms based on their current levels of investment. Therefore, I include
all measures of investment in year t-1 in the prediction model. Lastly, observations are matched
within year and Fama French 48 industry with a caliper of 0.01.
The covariate balance between treatment and control groups after matching is presented in
Panel B of Table 3.1. The covariate balance after matching is improved, but four of the matching
3All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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variables remain significantly different across treatment and control. Therefore, it is crucial to
control for all matching variables throughout the analyses.
3.3 Results
An increase in investment followed by a purchase by boutique institutions would be consis-
tent with Hypothesis 1, that boutiques curb managerial myopia. Table 3.2, Panel A presents the
results of Equation 3.1. Overall, I find increases in ownership by boutique institutional investors
(BoutiqueBuy) is positively associated with three measures of investment—R&D, R&D and ad-
vertising expense, and aggregate investment—providing support of Hypothesis 1. Important to my
design, I include indicators for net purchases by dedicated institutional investors in all manage-
rial myopia tests. As seen in Table 3.2, the positive association between boutique ownership and
change in investment is robust to the inclusion of dedicated ownership. In particular, the insignifi-
cant coefficient on DedicatedBuy is consistent with prior literature (Bushee, 1998).4
I next substitute the dichotomous measures of boutique and dedicated ownership and purchases
with continuous measures (Equation 3.2), and the results are consistent (Table 3.2, Panel B). The
change in boutique ownership from t-1 to t is positively associated with R&D, R&D and advertis-
ing, and PPE. On a one-tailed test, the change in boutique ownership is also positively associated
with the aggregate measure of investment. Overall, both specifications provide support in favor of
Hypothesis 1.
The control variables load consistently with the notion that investment opportunity, ability, and
history are relevant in predicting investment. Firms with greater resources invest more relative
to other firms in their industry. Cash and profitability (ROA) increase investment, while leverage
4While the finding that net purchases by dedicated institutions have no curbing effect on managerial myopia is con-
sistent with the literature (Bushee, 1998), it is possible that the lack of results could be a result of the propensity
score matched design. In particular, the results documented in Table 3.2 use a propensity score matched sample on
whether boutique institutional investors are net purchasers. It is unclear whether a sample matched on net purchases
by dedicated institutions will yield different findings. To address this concern, I replicate Table 3.2 but use Dedicated
Buy as the matching variable instead of Boutique Buy. In untabulated results, the coefficient on Dedicated Buy is
insignificant across all specifications and dependent variables. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Boutique Buy is
insignificant when the sample is matched on net purchases by dedicated institutions.
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Table 3.1: Covariate Balance
BoutiqueBuy=1 BoutiqueBuy=0 Difference
N µ1 N µ2 µ1 - µ2
Panel A: Full Sample
Institutional Ownership in t-1 13,192 0.614 22,646 0.515 0.100∗∗∗
Returns, t-1 13,192 0.034 22,646 0.040 -0.006
Market to Book in t-1 13,192 3.201 22,646 2.770 0.431∗∗∗
Cash in t-1 13,192 0.148 22,646 0.147 0.001
Retained Earnings in t-1 13,192 -0.156 22,646 -0.216 0.060∗∗∗
Return on Assets in t-1 13,192 0.100 22,646 0.081 0.019∗∗∗
Cash Flow from Operations in t-1 13,192 0.075 22,646 0.063 0.012∗∗∗
Tobin’s Q in t-1 13,192 2.152 22,646 1.926 0.225∗∗∗
Risk, t-1 13,192 2.465 22,646 2.796 -0.331∗∗∗
Research & Development in t-1 13,192 0.045 22,646 0.044 0.001
Advertising Expenses in t-1 13,192 0.012 22,646 0.011 0.001∗∗
Gross PPE in t-1 13,192 0.477 22,646 0.486 -0.009∗∗
Capital Expenditure in t-1 13,192 0.052 22,646 0.047 0.005∗∗∗
Panel B: Propensity Score Matched Sample
Institutional Ownership in t-1 5,685 0.675 5,685 0.685 -0.010∗∗
Returns, t-1 5,685 0.049 5,685 0.036 0.013∗
Market to Book in t-1 5,685 2.731 5,685 2.704 0.027
Cash in t-1 5,685 0.136 5,685 0.132 0.005∗
Retained Earnings in t-1 5,685 -0.108 5,685 -0.116 0.008
Return on Assets in t-1 5,685 0.106 5,685 0.105 0.000
Cash Flow from Operations in t-1 5,685 0.081 5,685 0.081 0.000
Tobin’s Q in t-1 5,685 1.928 5,685 1.903 0.025
Risk, t-1 5,685 2.319 5,685 2.338 -0.019
Research & Development in t-1 5,685 0.044 5,685 0.042 0.002
Advertising Expenses in t-1 5,685 0.011 5,685 0.011 0.000
Gross PPE in t-1 5,685 0.474 5,685 0.494 -0.020∗∗∗
Capital Expenditure in t-1 5,685 0.046 5,685 0.048 -0.001
This table presents the covariate balance in the sample before and after match-
ing on BoutiqueBuy. Reported results are based on a match within the same
Fama French 48 industry and year, a caliper of 0.01, and no replacement. The
stars on the mean difference correspond to the p-value of an paired two-sample
t-test between BoutiqueBuy=1 and BoutiqueBuy=0. The symbols *, **,
and *** correspond to a p-value less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Firm Investment and Net Purchases by Boutique Institutions
Panel A: Dichotomous Measures of Boutique Ownership
R&D RDAE Capex PPE Aggregate
Boutique Firm −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.006∗∗ −0.000
(−0.128) (−0.610) (−1.156) (−2.572) (−0.168)
Boutique Buy 0.003∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.000 0.002 0.002∗∗
(2.280) (1.947) (0.738) (1.458) (1.961)
Dedicated Firm −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.002
(−3.256) (−3.123) (1.307) (−3.617) (−0.917)
Dedicated Buy −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.000
(−0.018) (0.560) (0.352) (−2.753) (−0.042)
Dependent Variable in t-1 0.917∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(51.163) (65.967) (33.748) (169.057) (57.027)
Institutional Ownership in t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004∗∗
(0.450) (0.595) (1.107) (1.069) (2.030)
Returns, t-1 0.002 0.001 −0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.000
(1.128) (0.513) (−1.294) (2.039) (0.137)
Market to Book in t-1 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(1.549) (0.950) (−0.253) (−0.390) (0.233)
Cash in t-1 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(5.301) (4.838) (3.112) (4.019) (6.676)
Retained Earnings in t-1 −0.001 0.000 −0.001∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ −0.001
(−0.828) (0.531) (−2.228) (4.246) (−1.064)
Leverage in t-1 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 0.000 −0.008∗∗
(−4.023) (−2.601) (−0.654) (0.087) (−2.106)
Return on Assets in t-1 −0.013 0.002 0.022∗∗∗ −0.017 0.001
(−0.953) (0.164) (3.871) (−1.116) (0.090)
Cash Flow from Operations in t-1 0.035∗∗ 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.011
(2.368) (1.528) (1.500) (0.410) (0.761)
Tobin’s Q in t-1 −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001
(−1.918) (−2.589) (3.226) (−3.204) (1.086)
Log(Firm Age) 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.060) (0.110) (−0.686) (−4.130) (−2.397)
Firm Size in t-1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(5.454) (5.141) (0.153) (7.873) (2.029)
Risk, t-1 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(5.368) (6.007) (2.166) (7.435) (5.128)
Asset Growth in t-1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(3.143) (3.298) (2.820) (2.562) (2.330)
Std(ROA) in t-1 −0.086 −0.045 −0.058∗∗ −0.101 −0.005
(−1.363) (−0.843) (−2.245) (−1.493) (−0.089)
Std(CapEx) in t-1 −0.179∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.045
(−3.658) (−2.944) (9.917) (5.981) (0.953)
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 11, 370 11, 370 11, 370 11, 362 11, 370
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Table 3.2: Continued
Panel B: Continuous Measures of Boutique Ownership
R&D RDAE Capex PPE Aggregate
Boutique Ownership (%) in t −0.000 0.013 −0.003 −0.025 0.007
(−0.012) (0.604) (−0.329) (−0.866) (0.334)
∆ Boutique Ownership (%) from t-1 to t 0.130∗∗ 0.072∗ −0.001 0.131∗∗ 0.057
(2.425) (1.840) (−0.036) (2.097) (1.397)
Dedicated Ownership (%) in t 0.010 0.007 −0.000 −0.009 0.007
(0.841) (0.723) (−0.065) (−0.648) (0.769)
∆ Dedicated Ownership (%) from t-1 to t 0.016 0.011 −0.006 −0.016 −0.008
(0.892) (0.657) (−0.610) (−0.487) (−0.457)
Dependent Variable in t-1 0.916∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(50.741) (65.596) (33.814) (167.740) (57.017)
Institutional Ownership in t-1 −0.002 −0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003
(−0.546) (−0.473) (1.310) (0.083) (1.447)
Returns, t-1 0.002 0.001 −0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.000
(1.123) (0.525) (−1.305) (2.039) (0.135)
Market to Book in t-1 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(1.586) (0.937) (−0.269) (−0.398) (0.214)
Cash in t-1 0.040∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(5.217) (4.743) (3.183) (3.667) (6.689)
Retained Earnings in t-1 −0.001 0.000 −0.001∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ −0.001
(−0.845) (0.541) (−2.192) (4.187) (−1.039)
Leverage in t-1 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001 −0.008∗∗
(−4.034) (−2.638) (−0.666) (0.154) (−2.146)
Return on Assets in t-1 −0.014 0.001 0.023∗∗∗ −0.018 0.001
(−1.001) (0.108) (3.903) (−1.203) (0.082)
Cash Flow from Operations in t-1 0.035∗∗ 0.020 0.008 0.008 0.011
(2.386) (1.554) (1.480) (0.451) (0.760)
Tobin’s Q in t-1 −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001
(−1.956) (−2.656) (3.254) (−3.475) (1.134)
Log(Firm Age) 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.181) (0.305) (−0.720) (−3.840) (−2.327)
Firm Size in t-1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(5.541) (5.092) (0.192) (6.769) (2.258)
Risk, t-1 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(5.385) (6.004) (2.122) (7.473) (5.142)
Asset Growth in t-1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(3.059) (3.251) (2.886) (2.437) (2.335)
Std(ROA) in t-1 −0.083 −0.042 −0.059∗∗ −0.103 −0.003
(−1.320) (−0.794) (−2.265) (−1.507) (−0.052)
Std(CapEx) in t-1 −0.177∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.045
(−3.628) (−2.994) (9.903) (5.942) (0.960)
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 11, 370 11, 370 11, 370 11, 362 11, 370
Panel A (Panel B) reports the means (medians) and standard deviations of all types of institu-
tional owners: boutiques, dedicated, transient, quasi-index, and activist. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. Dedicated, transient, and quasi-index classifications are made available by Brian
Bushee. Activists are those institutions that have initiated a shareholder proposal. The classifi-
cation of boutique is defined in detail in Section 2.3. The stars on the mean values for dedicated,
transient, quasi-index, and activist correspond to the p-value of an unpaired two-sample t-test be-
tween boutiques and the respective type. The stars on the median values for dedicated, transient,
quasi-index, and activist correspond to the p-value of a non-parametric equality-of-medians test
between boutiques and the respective type. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. Continuous vari-
ables are winsorized at 1 and 99. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to a p-value less than
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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restricts investment. Larger firms and firms with more volatility in their stock price have greater
opportunity to invest and are positively associated with investment. The positive coefficient on
asset growth suggests that firms that have shown growth in the past are more likely to invest in the
future. Lastly, the prior years’ investment is strongly predictive of future investment.
Overall, the results provide evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1, that boutique institutional
investors curb managerial myopia. Increases in ownership by boutique institutional investors is
positively associated with larger levels of R&D, R&D and advertising expense, PP&E, and aggre-
gate investment within a propensity score matched sample.
3.3.1 Robustness Tests
While the empirical evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1, this setting suffers from en-
dogeneity concerns. An alternative explanation for the findings is that the firms boutiques are
choosing to invest in fundamentally differ from the firms that boutiques are not choosing to invest
in. To lend credence to the conclusion that boutiques can influence management and curb myopia,
I execute two alternative designs and a placebo test.
In untabulated analyses, I conduct a placebo test for my primary test of Hypothesis 1. In par-
ticular, in both Equations 3.1 and 3.2 I replace the dependent variables of yi,t with yi,t−2. Boutique
purchases in year t-1 to t should have no effect on investments in the prior year (t-2) if the relation
is causal. Indeed, I fail to reject the null in all models.
Next, I consider a difference-in-difference design where non-zero boutique ownership is the
treatment. The model is as follows:
yi,t =β1TreatmentY eari,t + β2TreatmentF irmi + β3yi,t−1 +X ′i,t−1Λ + αt + γff48 + i,t
(3.3)
TreatmentY ear is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has non-zero boutique ownership
in year t, and zero otherwise. TreatmentF irm is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has
non-zero boutique ownership at any point in the time series. TreatmentF irm captures differences
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between those firms in which boutiques do and do not decide to invest, and the year fixed effects(αt)
capture differences across years, thus the coefficient on TreatmentY ear can be interpreted as
the effect of boutique ownership on discretionary investment. An alternate specification replaces
TreatmentF irm with firm fixed effects (γi), as follows:
yi,t =β1TreatmentY eari,t + β2yi,t−1 +X ′i,t−1Λ + αt + γi + i,t (3.4)
The advantage of this model is that the firm fixed effects capture differences in investment behavior
for each firm. The limitation of this model is reduced power, because the model only captures
within-firm variation, of which, I only observe an average of 6 years per firm.
The results from these difference-in-difference designs (Equations 3.3 and 3.4) are tabulated
in Table 3.3 (Panels A and B, respectively). In Panel A, the coefficient on TreatmentY ear is
positive and significant for three out of five discretionary investment measures. In Panel B, where
power is reduced, the coefficient on TreatmentY ear is positive and significant for two out of five
discretionary investment measures. I find this evidence consistent with a causal interpretation of
the results.
Lastly, I investigate whether a change in boutique ownership influences a change in discre-
tionary investment. If the positive association between boutique purchases and discretionary in-
vestment is due to selection and not monitoring influence, then I would not expect a change in
monitoring outcomes to follow a change in boutique ownership. Using both dichotomous and
continuous measures of changes in boutique ownership, I estimate the following models using
ordinary least squares:
∆yi,t+1 =β1BoutiqueBuyi,t + β2DedicatedBuyi + ∆X
′
i,t−1Λ + i,t (3.5)
∆yi,t+1 =β1∆BoutiqueOwnershipi,t + β2∆DedicatedOwnershipi + ∆X
′
i,t−1Λ + i,t (3.6)
The results of Equations 3.5 and 3.6 are reported in Panels A and B of Table 3.4, respectively. In
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Table 3.3: Robustness Test Using Difference in Difference Design
Panel A: Difference in Difference Design
R&D RDAE Capex PPE Aggregate
Treatment Year 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
(1.841) (2.187) (−0.281) (3.098) (1.055)
Treatment Firm 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.004) (0.148) (−0.476) (−2.950) (0.644)
Dependent Variable in t-1 0.844∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(242.589) (266.649) (106.709) (430.810) (186.746)
Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Industry Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No
Observations 27, 122 27, 122 27, 122 23, 864 27, 122
Panel B: Fixed Effects Difference in Difference Design
R&D RDAE Capex PPE Aggregate
Treatment Year 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.001
(0.295) (0.431) (2.061) (1.718) (1.471)
Dependent Variable in t-1 0.386∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(60.436) (65.945) (46.492) (112.441) (53.315)
Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No
Firm Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 27, 228 27, 228 27, 228 23, 910 27, 228
This table presents the results of estimating firm investment using a difference-in-difference design. Panels A
and B correspond to Equations 3.3 and 3.4. Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and
99. t-statistics are in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** correspond to a p-value less than 0.1, 0.05,
and 0.01, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Test Using Changes Design
Panel A: Dichotomous Measures of Boutique Purchases
∆ R&D ∆ RDAE ∆ Capex ∆ PPE ∆ Aggregate
Boutique Buy 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(1.688) (2.533) (0.787) (4.152) (1.989)
Dedicated Buy 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(1.722) (1.864) (1.582) (3.342) (2.197)
Change in Institutional Ownership, t-1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(2.935) (3.640) (4.438) (5.151) (5.569)
∆ Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Fixed Effects No No No No No
Observations 30, 746 30, 746 30, 746 26, 795 30, 746
Panel B: Continuous Measures of Boutique Ownership
∆ R&D ∆ RDAE ∆ Capex ∆ PPE ∆ Aggregate
∆ Boutique Ownership, t-1 to t 0.010 0.024∗ 0.004 0.030 0.036
(0.804) (1.762) (0.270) (0.821) (1.506)
∆ Dedicated Ownership, t-1 to t 0.006 0.010∗ 0.011 0.017 0.024∗∗
(1.132) (1.673) (1.421) (0.848) (2.148)
∆ Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Fixed Effects No No No No No
Observations 30, 746 30, 746 30, 746 26, 795 30, 746
This table reports the results from estimating Equations 3.5 and 3.6 using ordinary least squares. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1
and 99. All regressions are clustered by firm. t-statistics are in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and ***
correspond to a p-value less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Panel A, BoutiqueBuy is positively associated with four out of five change in discretionary invest-
ment, suggesting that in the year following a purchase by boutique institutions, managerial myopia
is reduced and discretionary investment increases. In Panel B, the coefficients on ∆ Boutique
Ownership are consistently positive, but only significant for ∆RDAE. Interestingly, this design
also suggests some monitoring benefit of dedicated institutions as well. In light of the placebo test,
the difference-in-difference designs, and the changes analysis, the evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that boutiques are curbing myopia in management.
Lastly, another alternative explanation to the effect I document is that I am picking up on
a “concentration effect” and not a “boutique effect.” In a study of which institutions monitor
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management, Fich et al. (2015) focus on the weight of a given firm in that institutions’ portfolio.
They posit that an institution will be more motivated to monitor a firm when that firm represents
a larger portion (10%) of its portfolio. In the setting of acquisitions, they find target firms with
these institutions as shareholders have greater bid completion rates, higher premiums, and lower
acquirer returns. Thus, the authors conclude that institutions are more incentivized to monitor a
firm when their assets are concentrated in that firm.
To disentangle whether the result I find is driven only by boutiques’ concentration of assets,
I replicate the analyses in Table 3.2 and include variables Concentrated Firm and Concentrated
Buy. These two variables are constructed similarly to Boutique Firm and Boutique Buy for non-
boutique institutions in the top tercile of internal concentration. In other words, Concentrated Firm
and Concentrated Buy should capture the influence of institutions that have a highly concentrated
investment strategy, but do not meet the other criteria of a boutique institutional investor. In all
tests, the coefficients on Boutique Firm and Boutique Buy remain consistent, but the coefficients
Concentrated Firm and Concentrated Buy are insignificant or significant in the opposite direction.
3.4 Mechanism of Influence
Thus far the evidence documented in this paper is consistent with the conclusion that boutiques
do monitor management. This finding reflects the prediction that boutiques are incentivized to
monitor management due to their concentrated holdings. However, it is still not apparent why
management would respond to boutiques’ demands due to their small size and small holdings. Un-
derstanding why management might heed the institutional voice of boutiques is important because
it lends credence to a causal interpretation of the results: that boutiques are effective monitors of
management.
A potential source of boutiques’ influence is their specialization. Boutiques are unique among
institutional investors in that they select fewer investments and often concentrate these investments
by industry. If other institutional investors consider boutiques as experts, then boutiques’ decision
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to buy or sell a stock may have a ripple effect in the market. Thus, boutiques may have influence
beyond their direct holdings as a result of their expertise.
To test this prediction, I examine whether non-boutiques’ buy and sell decisions are influenced
in part by boutiques’ buy and sell decisions. If abnormal non-boutique trading following boutiques’
change in ownership, then it would suggest that non-boutiques are observing and responding to
boutiques’ trading decisions. This behavior would suggest that non-boutiques consider boutiques
to have expertise. Using quarterly observations, I estimate the following model using ordinary
least squares:
∆AdjNonBoutiqueOwnership(%)i,t+1 =β1∆BoutiqueOwnership(%)i,t +X
′
i,tΛ + i,t
(3.7)
The dependent variable is the change in non-boutique ownership in quarter t+1 adjusted by the
average change in non-boutique ownership in quarters t-3 to t. I use an adjusted measure in order
to account for recent trends in the non-boutiques’ buying or selling patterns. The independent
variable of interest is the change in boutique ownership in quarter t. I control for determinants of
institutional ownership as documented in prior literature (Xi,t) including firm characteristics, firm
performance, and stock characteristics (Chung and Zhang, 2011). Table 3.5, Column (1) presents
the results. An increase (decrease) in boutique ownership in quarter t is associated with an above-
average increase (decrease) in non-boutique ownership in quarter t+1.
I next examine whether it is boutique purchases or sales that non-boutiques are following,
because a boutique’s divestment may be more informative than an increased investment in the
firm. In column (2) I replace ∆ BoutiqueOwnership(%) with Boutique Buy and Boutique Sell.
Boutique Buy (Sell) is an indicator variable equal to one if boutiques purchased (sold) stock in
firm i in quarter t. In column (3), I add indicator variables for meaningful boutique purchases
and sales when boutiques purchase or sell more than one percent of common stock outstanding
in the quarter. The coefficients on Boutique Sell and Meaningful Boutique Sell are negative and
significant. This suggests that non-boutiques are selling after boutiques sell, and this effect is
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Table 3.5: Are Boutiques Leaders Among Institutions
All Boutiques Industry Expert Boutiques
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Boutique Ownership (%) 0.193∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗
(2.093) (2.864)
Boutique Buy 0.001 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.519) (2.940) (3.021)
Meaningful Boutique Buy −0.001 0.002
(−0.445) (0.500)
Boutique Sell −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(−3.440) (−2.420) (−3.107) (−2.742)
Meaningful Boutique Sell −0.004∗∗ −0.007
(−2.104) (−1.118)
MVE −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(−3.832) (−3.407) (−3.624) (−3.817) (−3.704) (−3.701)
Tobin’s Q −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.257) (−0.244) (−0.253) (−0.224) (−0.231) (−0.223)
Leverage 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗ 0.004 0.004 0.004
(1.646) (1.659) (1.694) (1.632) (1.626) (1.636)
YTD ROA −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(−2.627) (−2.664) (−2.660) (−2.650) (−2.619) (−2.632)
YTD Free Cash Flow −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.044) (−0.025) (−0.037) (−0.040) (−0.045) (−0.044)
Risk −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(−2.571) (−2.535) (−2.551) (−2.568) (−2.568) (−2.579)
BHAR 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(3.724) (3.681) (3.698) (3.745) (3.737) (3.744)
Price 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(1.767) (1.774) (1.706) (1.773) (1.780) (1.765)
Bid Ask Spread 0.090 0.092 0.091 0.089 0.089 0.089
(1.256) (1.261) (1.250) (1.243) (1.248) (1.248)
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.401) (1.383) (1.530) (1.400) (1.370) (1.390)
Log(Firm Age) 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.400) (2.429) (2.394) (2.417) (2.421) (2.418)
Quarter Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Industry Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 173, 075 173, 075 173, 075 173, 075 173, 075 173, 075
R-Squared 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093
This table reports the results from estimating Equation 3.7 using ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in
all models is the change in non-boutique ownership in quarter t+1 adjusted by the average change in non-boutique
ownership in quarters t-3 to t. All independent variables are measured in quarter t. In columns (1) through (3)
all boutiques are included in the calculation of the boutique variables. In columns (4) through (6) only industry
expert boutiques are included in the calculation of boutique variables. Boutiques are an industry expert when their
primary industry of investment is the same as the industry of the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Observations are by quarter and firm. The sample period os 2003 to 2015. Continuous variables are winsorized at
1 and 99. All regressions are clustered by firm. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to a p-value less than 0.1,
0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
38
stronger when the boutiques’ sale is large.
I expect this result to be strongest when the boutique is also an industry expert. Columns (4)
through (6) paralell columns (1) through (3) but substitute the boutique variables with industry
expert boutique variables. A boutique is considered an industry expert when their primary industry
of investment is the same as the industry of the firm.5 The coefficient on ∆ BoutiqueOwnership(%)
for industry experts (1.180) is significantly larger than the coefficient for all boutiques (0.193,
Chi-square statistic of 7.11), suggesting that a higher level of expertise has greater influence on
non-boutique institutions. In columns (5) and (6), the coefficients on Boutique Buy (Boutique
Sell) are significant and positive (negative), the coefficients on Meaningful Boutique Buy (Sell)
are insignificant. When it comes to industry expert boutiques, it does not require a meaningful
purchase or sale to influence non-boutique institutions’ investment decisions.
Overall, the evidence suggests that non-boutiques are observing and following the investing
decisions of boutique institutional investors. This response is strongest when boutiques also have
a industry expertise. This empirical evidence suggests that other institutional investors notice bou-
tiques’ expertise and boutiques’ investment decisions have influence beyond their holdings. Thus,
boutiques’ expertise is one channel through which boutiques garner influence to effectively moni-
tor management.
5A boutique’s primary industry is defined as the Fama French 48 industry in which the boutique has the largest
proportion of assets invested. For example, a boutique has 45% of its assets invested in industry 10, 30% in industry
15, and 25% in industry 40. That boutique’s primary industry is Fama French industry 10. That boutique will only
be included as an expert for firms in industry 10.
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4. VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF BOUTIQUE OWNERSHIP
4.1 Hypothesis Development
A broader implication of boutique ownership is whether boutique-owned firms have above-
average returns. There are several channels through which boutiques may earn abnormal returns.
In particular, improved monitoring has the potential to increase firm value (Black, 1992). Addi-
tionally, an information advantage, enjoyed by some institutional investors, can translate to future
returns (Yan and Zhang, 2009). Boutiques’ expertise would play an important role in both of these
possible channels.
First, corporate governance oversight by boutique institutions may contribute to above-average
returns. Optimal corporate governance mechanisms vary with the needs of the firm. For example,
Coles et al. (2008) demonstrate that the optimal board structure can vary in the cross section and
conclude that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to corporate governance is potentially value-destroying.
Thus, a uniformly applied corporate governance practice may not maximize value for every firm.
However, boutiques are uniquely poised, due to their expertise, to influence corporate governance
in a tailored, firm-specific approach. Thus, boutiques’ influence is likely to be value enhancing,
resulting in above-average market returns.
Second, sophisticated investors - such as institutional investors - use information advantages
to earn abnormal returns (e.g., Bennett et al., 2003; Yan and Zhang, 2009). The information ad-
vantage traded on by institutional investors can originate from two sources: public information not
yet reflected in stock price or private information. For example, consistent with the notion that
institutional investors have a firm-level information advantage, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004)
find that institutional trading facilitates the assimilation of firm-level information into stock price.
Additionally, Maffett (2012) documents evidence consistent with institutional investors trading on
private information by studying the relation between institutional trades and future returns within
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a cross-section of information environment opacity.
However, it is not obvious that boutiques will earn abnormal returns. First, corporate gov-
ernance changes may not necessarily earn abnormal returns. For example, Bhagat and Bolton
(2008) find that governance measures, while correlated with operating performance, are not cor-
related with stock market performance. Thus, boutiques’ influence on the corporate governance
framework may not have any stock market performance implication. Second, it is institutions’
economies of scale that make costly information acquisition affordable. While boutiques’ small
size affords them expertise, it may also constrain their ability to acquire information.
Thus, I state my second hypothesis in the alternative:
Hypothesis 2. Boutique institutional investors earn abnormal returns.
Lastly, I investigate the prediction that boutique institutions have an information advantage. As
previously stated, boutiques’ expertise could enable boutiques to use public information that is not
yet reflected in price and to generate private information.
Consistent with the claim that public information is impounded gradually into stock price,
Choi and Sias (2012) find that financial strength (as measured by the Piotroski (2000) F-Score)
predicts future returns. Additionally, Choi and Sias (2012) find that the information in a firm’s
fundamentals is incorporated through trades made by institutional investors. Thus, they conclude
that these sophisticated investors are superior at recognizing undervaluation of firms with strong
financial condition. Choi and Sias (2012) also find that transient institutions are first to act in
incorporating financial information into stock price, suggesting that transient institutions are more
sophisticated that non-transient institutions.
Boutiques’ expertise may enable a more sophisticated use of publicly available information.
In particular, their expertise may be able to help them identify inconsistencies between financial
strength and valuation. If boutiques are sophisticated users of financial information, I expect bou-
tiques to trade on information in firm fundamentals. I state this hypothesis in the alternative:
41
Hypothesis 3a. Boutique institutional investors trade on information in firm funda-
mentals.
There are several reasons to expect boutiques to trade on information incremental to fundamen-
tals. Boutiques may use information generated by their expertise, such as a superior understanding
of industry trends or superior forecasting of future demand and profitability. Also, boutiques’ lim-
ited number of investments potentially enables greater investment in expertise via the acquisition
of private information. Firm-specific, private information can be costly. For an institution with
hundreds of investments, obtaining this costly, firm-specific, private information may not produce
sufficient returns to be worthwhile. However, boutique institutions have a small number of invest-
ments, therefore such costly information may be worthwhile to obtain.
If boutiques trade on information incremental to what is publicly available, then I expect bou-
tiques to earn larger abnormal returns holding fundamentals constant. I state this hypothesis in the
alternative:
Hypothesis 3b. Boutique institutional investors earn higher abnormal returns, hold-
ing constant firm fundamentals.
4.2 Research Design
To test the value implication of boutique ownership, I estimate the Fama and French (2015)
five-factor asset pricing model for institutional investor portfolios as follows:
Ri,t −RF,t =α + β1(RM,t −RF,t) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4RMWt + β5CMAt + i,t
(4.1)
The five-factor model captures the relation between portfolio returns and factor-mimicking
returns, designed to capture common predictors of returns. Ri,t is a security or portfolio return in
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time t. RM,t is the market rate and RF,t is the risk free rate (U.S. Treasury Bill rate). β1 indicates
the sensitivity of the security or portfolio to changes in the market. In addition to market returns,
the four other factors that predict security returns are size, value, profitability and asset growth.1
These factors are computed as the return to a diversified and hedged portfolio. For example, SMBt
is the return of a diversified portfolio of small stocks less the return of a diversified portfolio of
large stocks (Fama and French, 2015). Similarly, HMLt is high minus low book-to-market stocks,
RMWt is stocks of robust minus weak profitability, and CMAt is low minus high asset growth.2
The parameter of interest is α: the portion of returns not explained by one of the five factors.
In other words, α can be thought of as the impact of the institutional investor. A more positive α
implies superiority at selecting value-increasing firms.
I regress monthly returns Rt on the five-factors (Equation 4.1) for each institutional investor,
i. Since I only have the institution’s composition of investments at four points in the year–the end
of each calendar quarter, per 13F filing requirements–I assume the holdings reported at the end of
a given quarter are held through the end of the following quarter. I require four years of monthly
data in order to run a time-series regression for a given institution. From each institutions’ time-
series regression, I capture the unique set of parameters. I then calculated the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) test statistic to test if the α of boutique institutional investors is positive. Following from
Hypothesis 2, I predict:
α¯boutique > 0 (4.2)
I next examine the use of firm fundamentals by boutiques and whether boutiques are able to
identify undervalued firms holding constant the firm’s fundamentals. It is known that firm funda-
mentals can predict future returns (Piotroski, 2000). And it is also known that holding constant firm
1I use the language “asset growth” to distinguish nominal asset growth as used in Fama and French (2015) from
“investment” as used in this paper to describe research and development, capital expenditure, and other investments
in projects and fixed assets.
2All factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.
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fundamentals, considerable variation in future returns remains (Piotroski and So, 2012). There-
fore, if boutiques are sophisticated users of financial statements then I expect the fundamentals
of boutique-owned firms to be stronger than those of non-boutique-owned firms (Hypothesis 3a).
In addition, if boutiques have an informational advantage then I expect boutiques to enjoy higher
BHARs holding constant firm fundamentals (Hypothesis 3b).
I rely on the Piotroski (2000) F-Score. The F-Score is a integer value on a scale of 0 to 9, where
for each of nine criteria met, a firm is awarded one point. A low (high) F-Score indicates weak
(strong) firm fundamentals. Based on their F-Score, firms are assigned into one of three tiers:
“low” includes firms with F-Scores of 0-3; “medium” includes firms with F-Scores of 4-6; and
“high” includes firms with F-Scores of 7-9 (Piotroski and So, 2012). The F-Score contains four
criteria to measure firm profitability: positive ROA, positive cash flows from operations, positive
change in ROA, and negative accruals. The F-Score contains three criteria to measure financial
health: negative change in leverage, positive change in liquidity, and no equity issuance. Lastly,
the F-Score is rounded out by two criteria measuring operating efficiency: a positive change in
gross margin ratio, and a positive change in the asset turnover ratio. All variables are detailed in
Appendix A. My test of Hypothesis 3a is a two-tailed t-test comparing the F-Scores for firms with
and without boutique ownership.
Financial statement information used in computing the F-Score is publicly available to insti-
tutional investors by the beginning of the fourth month after the fiscal year end (Piotroski, 2000;
Piotroski and So, 2012). However, I only observe the institutional investors update their portfolios
at the end of each calendar year quarter. Therefore, I compute annual BHAR beginning with the
date of the first 13F filed 5 months after the fiscal year end.3 I classify the firm as owned by a
boutique institution if ownership by boutique institutions is greater than zero for the same year in
which I measure BHARs. My primary test of Hypothesis 3b is a two-tailed t-test comparing the
3For example, I assume the financial statements of a firm with a December 31 fiscal year is available for use by
institutional investors in April. Therefore, I use the next 13F filing date after April as the beginning of the BHAR for
the year. In this case, that filing date is June 30.
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BHARs for firms owned by boutiques and firms without boutique ownership within F-Score tier.
4.3 Results
I next examine whether boutiques earn returns in excess of known risk factors (Hypothesis 2).
First, I consider descriptive evidence. For each institution in my sample, I compute its portfolio’s
quarterly buy and hold abnormal returns (henceforth, BHARs).4 On average, boutiques earn 0.53%
quarterly BHARs, which is significantly greater than zero (t-statistic of 7.79) and significantly
greater than the BHARs earned by dedicated, transient, and quasi-index institutional investors, on
average.
My sample consists of 2,704 unique institutional investors with more than five years (60
months) of data in order to execute the time-series regressions outlined in Equation 4.1. I classify
an institutions based on their permanent classification.5 All institutions not classified as boutique
are classified as non-boutique. For each unique institutional investor, I regress monthly returns on
five market factors and a constant (Fama and French, 2015). I retain the coefficients from each
regression and average them by institution type in Table 4.1, Panel A. Also tabulated are Fama and
MacBeth (1973) test statistics for the average coefficients.6
The primary coefficient of interest is α, the abnormal performance of the portfolios of each
type of institutional investor. Alpha (α) can be thought of as the skill of the institution to create
a portfolio that generates returns incremental to those predicted by known market factors.7 I find
evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2: boutique institutional investors earn returns in excess of
returns explained by known risk factors. The mean α of boutique institutional investors is 0.145
with a Fama Macbeth t-statistic of 2.89. This results implies that boutique institutions have a
superior skill at selecting portfolios that earn abnormal returns.8
4I assume that all investments reported in the 13F filing are held for the entire calendar quarter.
5Dedicated, transient, quasi-index and activist categories exclude all permanent boutiques. The results are unchanged
if overlap institutions are included in both groups.
6The test statistic is computed as the coefficient mean divided by the coefficient standard error (e.g., α¯/(sα/
√
N)).
7A negative α does not equate to negative BHARs. All institutions (and institution categories) have, on average,
positive BHARs. The negative α indicates that the returns are not incremental to these five known market factors.
8I report p-values from one-tailed t-tests. However, results are robust to a two-tailed t-test.
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Table 4.1: Institution-Level Asset Pricing Analysis
Panel A: Model Summary by Institutional Owner Type
Boutique Non-Boutique Dedicated Transient Quasi-Index Activist
Average coefficients (Fama MacBeth t-statistics)
α¯ 0.145 −0.070 0.126 0.008 −0.119 0.083
(2.89) (−10.25) (1.60) (0.53) (−18.68) (2.43)
β¯Mkt−rf 1.056 1.024 1.063 1.078 0.993 1.023
(57.94) (350.88) (31.93) (187.54) (340.10) (71.63)
β¯SMB 0.327 0.109 0.383 0.238 0.030 0.283
(11.89) (19.22) (6.83) (24.00) (4.99) (11.12)
β¯HML 0.038 0.026 0.142 −0.047 0.062 0.065
(1.13) (4.68) (2.15) (−4.22) (10.86) (2.50)
β¯RMW −0.099 0.033 0.003 −0.068 0.088 −0.058
(−2.57) (5.83) (0.03) (−6.08) (16.42) (−2.01)
β¯CMA −0.149 −0.072 −0.177 −0.162 −0.020 −0.148
(−3.540) (−11.90) (−2.10) (−13.19) (−3.37) (−5.34)
Average R-Square 0.650 0.844 0.621 0.803 0.873 0.758
Number of Institutions’
Time-Series Regressions 176 2528 55 871 1601 156
Panel B: Unpaired t-test on α between Institutional Owner Types
Number Number α¯bou > α¯i
Number of Mean α Positive α Negative α t-statistic
Institutions (sα) [Significant] [Significant] (p-value)
Boutique 176 0.145 106 70 N/A
(0.665) [17] [2]
Non-Boutique 2,528 -0.070 788 1,740 7.39
(0.344) [103] [623] (0.000)
Dedicated 55 0.126 31 24 0.19
(0.582) [4] [1] (0.424)
Transient 871 0.008 403 468 3.44
(0.436) [70] [99] (0.000)
Quasi-Index 1,601 -0.120 354 1,247 10.39
(0.255) [29] [522] (0.000)
Activist 156 0.083 90 66 0.99
(0.428) [17] [9] (0.162)
This table summarizes the parameters estimated from Fama and French (2015) five-factor as-
set pricing model by institutional investor type. Institution types are defined in Appendix A.
The dependent variable in all regressions is the institution’s monthly portfolio return adjusted
for the risk free rate. The monthly risk free rate, market rate, and factors are obtained from
Kenneth French’s website. Reported coefficients (Panel A) are averages from time-series re-
gressions for institutions with more than 48 months of data. Fama and MacBeth (1973) test
statistics for α (and each β) are computed as α¯/(sα/
√
N) (or substitute α for the respective
β). Reported test statistics (Panel B, Column 5) are from an unpaired two sample t-test be-
tween α of boutique institutional investors and the α of the other corresponding institutional
investor type. Significance (Panel B, Columns 3 and 4) is determined at the 0.05 level.
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In addition, α for boutique institutional investors is, on average, larger than that of non-
boutiques, dedicated, transient, and quasi-index institutions. To test whether these differences are
significant, I employ unpaired, two-sample t-tests. The results are tabulated in Panel B. Boutiques
perform similarly to dedicated institutional investors and activists (t-statistic of .19 and .99, respec-
tively) and outperform non-boutiques, transient and quasi-index institutional investors (t-statistics
of 7.38, 3.44 and 10.39, respectively). While the boutiques’ approach to portfolio building dif-
fers from the approach of dedicated and activist institutions in many respects, all of these types of
institutions appear to enjoy premiums from a superior selection capability.
The remaining coefficients on the asset pricing models in Panel A reveal some interesting
distinctions of the boutiques’ portfolios. First, boutiques have greater exposure to market risk than
non-boutiques.9 Additionally, there is no evidence that boutique institutions are selecting firms
based on a size, value, or profitability strategy. Lastly, the strong negative coefficient on CMA
suggests that boutiques are selecting firms with high nominal asset growth.
Also of note, the average R-square of the boutiques’ asset pricing model tests is 65.0% while
the average R-square for non-boutiques is 84.4%. Therefore, the performance of the boutiques’
portfolios is not as well explained by known risk factors than non-boutique institutions. It is per-
haps unsurprising, then, that quasi-index institutions have the highest R-square of 87.3%, because
quasi-index institutions are known for holding a diverse investment portfolio with low turnover,
similar to how the risk factor portfolios are formed.
Next, I test whether boutiques trade on information in firm fundamentals (Hypothesis 3a) by
comparing the F-Score of firms with and without boutique ownership. I report the results in Ta-
ble 4.2. The average F-Score of firms owned by boutiques is 4.950, while the average F-Score
of firms not owned by boutiques is 4.654. These means are significantly different (t-statistic of
20.430), thus, boutiques appear to use fundamentals in their selection process and select firms
9In untabulated results, the boutiques’ average βMkt−rf is statistically greater than the average βMkt−rf of non-
boutiques (t-statistic of 2.70) and quasi-index institutions (t-statistic of 5.95), using unpaired, two-sample, t-tests.
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with higher-quality fundamentals. This finidng supports Hypothesis 3a. Additionally, consistent
with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.2, Boutique-owned firms have higher BHARs
on average (3.4% versus 2.6%, t-statistic of 2.109).10
Having established that boutiques use firm fundamentals in their investment decisions, I in-
vestigate whether boutiques trade on information incremental to what is publicly available. If
boutiques enjoy a greater BHAR holding F-Score constant, then this provides evidence consistent
with the claim that boutiques have an informational advantage (Hypothesis 3b).
I examine differences in BHARs for three tiers of F-Scores: “low”, “medium”, and “high”.
In both the low and medium categories, boutique-owned firms enjoy higher BHARs than non-
boutique-owned firms (t-statistics 2.335 and 2.453, respectively). However, in the high F-Score
tier, boutique-owned firms under-perform non-boutique-owned firms (t-statistic of -4.126). Panel
B paints a similar picture to the results summarized in Panel A, but relies on the annually refreshed
classification of boutique firm (see BoutiqueQ in Table 2.1 Panel B) instead of the permanent
classification of boutique. Results are stronger (and contrary results are weaker) using the annually
refreshed classification of boutique firm, consistent with the conclusion that it is the boutique
strategy that enables the information advantage.
There are several possible explanations for these findings. Boutiques’ industry expertise may
provide an informational advantage, thereby boutiques distinguish winners from losers within an
industry. Alternatively, since boutiques only invest in a small number of firms (relative to other
types of institutional investors), boutiques may commit more resources to monitoring the true value
of their investments. Irrespective of the source, this analysis provides evidence that boutiques do
enjoy an informational advantage that enables them to distinguish winners from losers even after
taking into account the firms’ financial health.
10This average differs from the average presented in Table 2.2 for two reasons. First, Table 2.2 presents quarter BHAR,
while Table 4.2 presents annual BHAR. Second, Table 2.2 presents all quarters in the sample, while Table 4.2 only
presents the BHAR that begins with the first 13F filing date five months after the firm’s fiscal year end.
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Table 4.2: Fundamentals and Returns
Panel A: Permanent Boutique Classification of Boutique Firm
Boutique=1 Boutique=0 Difference
N µ1 N µ2 µ1 − µ2 t-stat
Mean F-Score and BHAR by Boutique Ownership
F-Score 27,782 4.950 23,295 4.654 0.297∗∗∗ 20.430
BHAR 27,443 0.034 22,843 0.026 0.008∗∗ 2.109
Mean BHAR by F-Score Tier and Boutique Ownership
Low 5,179 0.029 5,701 0.006 0.022∗∗ 2.335
Medium 17,099 0.035 13,963 0.023 0.011∗∗ 2.453
High 5,165 0.037 3,179 0.072 −0.035∗∗∗ −4.126
Panel B: Quarterly Refreshed Classification of Boutique Firm
BoutiqueQ=1 BoutiqueQ=0 Difference
N µ1 N µ2 µ1 − µ2 t-stat
Mean F-Score and BHAR by Boutique Ownership
F-Score 34,618 4.921 16,459 4.593 0.327∗∗∗ 21.164
BHAR 34,172 0.036 16,114 0.019 0.017∗∗∗ 4.214
Mean BHAR by F-Score Tier and Boutique Ownership
Low 6,646 0.028 4,234 −0.001 0.029∗∗∗ 2.938
Medium 21,304 0.035 9,758 0.017 0.018∗∗∗ 3.666
High 6,222 0.045 2,122 0.064 −0.019∗∗ −1.963
This table summarizes the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of firms owned
and not owned by boutique institutions and by F-Score. BHARs are computed
using daily returns adjusted for a value-weighted portfolio for the year beginning
with the calendar quarter that begins at least 5 months after the end of the fiscal
year. Boutique and BoutiqueQ are as defined in Appendix A. The low, medium,
and high F-Score tiers contain firms with F-Scores in the ranges 0-3, 4-6, and 7-9,
respectively. The sample period is 2003 to 2015. BHARs are trimmed at 1 and 99.
Reported t-statistics are from a two-tailed unpaired t-test. The symbols *, **, and
*** correspond to a p-value less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
49
5. CONCLUSIONS
Boutiques, a previously unexplored type of institutional investor, have recently emerged as a
relevant participant in the equity market. Boutiques specialize in asset management and are char-
acterized by limited assets under management and a concentrated investment strategy. Boutiques’
concentrated investment strategy facilitates the development of expertise and creates incentive to
engage in corporate governance oversight. However, boutiques’ small size calls into question
whether they can be influential. I find evidence consistent with the claim that boutiques curb man-
agerial oversight, suggesting that they contribute to corporate governance oversight. Additionally,
boutiques appear to have a beneficial impact on firm value, forming portfolios with abnormal re-
turns. Lastly, consistent with the conclusion that boutiques’ enjoy an information advantage as
a result of their expertise and specialization, I find that boutiques generally earn larger abnormal
returns, holding constant the firms’ fundamentals.
My contribution is threefold. First, I classify an unexplored type of institution. I demonstrate
how boutiques differ than other established types of institutional investors. Secondly, this paper
contributes to the corporate governance literature. I respond to the call of the OECD for a re-
examination of the role institutional owners play in corporate governance by studying boutiques in
this setting. While boutiques’ role in corporate governance oversight is theoretically ambiguous,
this paper provides empirical evidence that boutiques curb managerial myopia and positively con-
tribute to corporate governance oversight. Lastly, I contribute to the literature by providing insights
into the source of boutiques’ information advantage.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Institutional investor classifications of dedicated, transient, and quasi-index are generously
provided by Brian Bushee on his website. Asset pricing model factors generously provided by
Kenneth French on his website. All other data are from Compustat, CRSP, or Thompson Reuters.
Where applicable, Compustat variables used are in parentheses.
Institution Types
BoutiqueQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 75% or more of the quarters in the
last 5 years satisfy the boutique requirements and equal to zero other-
wise. The boutique requirements are that the institution has less than
one hundred billion in assets under management, invests only in com-
mon stock (excluding exchange traded funds), is in the top tercile of
internal concentration, and is an investment company or independent
investment advisor.
Boutique is an indicator variable equal to one if BoutiqueQ is equal to one for
all quarters in the time-series and equal to zero otherwise. Throughout
the paper, these institutions are referred to as ‘boutique institutional
investors.’
BoutiqueFirm is a firm-level indicator variable equal to one if the percentage of
common shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional
investors is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
BoutiqueBuy is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the percentage
of common shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional
investors is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
BoutiqueSell is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the percentage
of common shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional
investors is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
Meaningful Boutique
Buy
is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the percentage
of common shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional
investors is greater than 1% and equal to zero otherwise.
Meaningful Boutique
Sell
is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the percentage
of common shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional
investors is less than negative 1% and equal to zero otherwise.
Boutique Ownership is a continuous variable equal to the percentage of common shares
outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional investors.
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∆ Boutique Ownership is a continuous variable equal to the change in the percentage of com-
mon shares outstanding (csho) owned by boutique institutional in-
vestors.
Dedicated Transient, and Quasi-Index institutions are indicators equal to one if
the institution is not a boutique and Brian Bushee’s permclass equals
DED, TRA, and QIX, respectively, and equal to zero otherwise.
Activist is an indicator equal to one if the institutional investor is not a boutique
and it initiates a shareholder campaign at any time in the period 2000
to 2016 and equal to zero otherwise.
DedicatedFirm is a firm-level indicator variable equal to one if the percentage of com-
mon shares outstanding (csho) owned by dedicated institutional in-
vestors is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
DedicatedBuy is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in the percentage of
common shares outstanding (csho) owned by dedicated institutional
investors is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
Dedicated Ownership is a continuous variable equal to the percentage of common shares
outstanding (csho) owned by dedicated institutional investors.
∆ Dedicated Owner-
ship
is a continuous variable equal to the change in the percentage of com-
mon shares outstanding (csho) owned by dedicated institutional in-
vestors.
Treatment Firm is a firm indicator variable equal to one if the firm had non-zero bou-
tique ownership in the sample period, and zero otherwise.
Treatment Year is a firm-year indicator variable equal to one if the firm had non-zero
boutique ownership in that year, and zero otherwise.
Institution Characteristics
Assets Under Manage-
ment (AUM)
is a continuous variable equal to Σ(pricei ∗ sharesi), where pricei is
the price per share of firm i and sharesi is the number of shares the
institution owns of firm i.
Concentration is a continuous variable equal to Σ[(pricei∗sharesi)2]/AUM2, where
pricei is the price per share of firm i, sharesi is the number of shares
the institution owns of firm i, and AUM is the institution’s assets under
management.
Number of Investees is a count variable equal to the number of distinct CUSIPs invested in
by the institution.
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Institutional Owner’s
Age
is a continuous variable equal to the 13F filing date minus the institu-
tional investor’s first 13F filing date.
Stability of Holdings is equal to the weighted percentage of assets under management held
for eight consecutive quarters.
Portfolio Turnover is equal to the change in assets under management divided by the av-
erage of beginning and ending assets under management.
Average Holding Pe-
riod (Yrs)
is equal to the mean number years each investment has been held by
the institutional investor.
Average Pct. Holdings is equal to the mean percent of common shares outstanding owned by
the institution in their investments.
Percent Held in Large
Blocks
is equal to the percentage of assets under management that are block-
holder positions. A blockholder position is defined as ownership of
5% or more of common shares outstanding.
Herfindahl Concentra-
tion
is a continuous variable equal to ln(Σ[(sharesi/cshoi)2]) where
sharesi is the number of shares the institution owns of firm i and
cshoi is the common shares outstanding of firm i.
FF48 Industry Concen-
tration
is a continuous variable equal to Σ[(AUMff48)2]/AUM2, where
AUMff48 is the dollar value of assets invested in the Fama French
48 industry ff48 and AUM is the institution’s total assets under man-
agement.
Portfolio BHAR is a continuous variable equal to the weighted average quarterly buy
and hold abnormal return of the firms held by an institutional investor
for the calendar-year quarter following the 13F filing date.
Portfolio Avg Assets is a continuous variable equal to the weighted average assets of the
firms held by an institutional investor for the calendar-year quarter
following the 13F filing date.
Portfolio Avg MTB is a continuous variable equal to the weighted average market to book
of the firms held by an institutional investor for the calendar-year quar-
ter following the 13F filing date.
Portfolio Avg Growth is a continuous variable equal to the weighted average asset growth
from t-1 to t of the firms held by an institutional investor for the
calendar-year quarter following the 13F filing date.
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Portfolio Avg Firm Age is a continuous variable equal to the weighted average firm age of the
firms held by an institutional investor for the calendar-year quarter
following the 13F filing date.
Firm Characteristics
R&D is a continuous variable equal to the maximum of zero or research and
development (xrd) divided by total assets (at).
RDAE is a continuous variable equal to the maximum of zero or research and
development (xrd) plus advertising expenses (xad) divided by total
assets (at).
Capital Expenditure
(Capex)
is a continuous variable equal to the maximum of zero or capital ex-
penditure (capx) divided by total assets (at).
Plant, Property and
Equipment (PPE)
is a continuous variable equal to gross plant property and equipment
(ppegt) scaled by total assets (at).
Total Investment (Ag-
gregate)
is a continuous variable equal to the sum of research and develop-
ment (xrd), advertising expense (xad), and capital expenditure (capx)
divided by total assets (at).
Institutional Ownership is a continuous variable equal to the percent of total common stock
outstanding (csho) that is owned by institutional owners.
Cash is a continuous variable equal to cash (ch) divided by total assets (at).
Retained Earnings is a continuous variable equal to retained earnings (re) divided by total
assets (at).
Return on Assets is a continuous variable equal to earnings before deprecation (oibdp)
divided by total assets (at).
Cash Flow from Opera-
tions
is a continuous variable equal to cash flow from operations (oancf).
Tobin’s Q is a continuous variable equal to total assets (at) less book value of
equity (ceq) plus market value of equity (prcc_f * csho) divided by
total assets (at).
Firm Size is a continuous variable equal to the log of total assets (at).
Risk is a continuous variable equal to the standard deviation of daily
market-adjusted reutrns over year t times 100.
Leverage is a continuous variable equal to long term debt (dltt) plus current
liabilities (dlc) divided by total assets.
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Firm Age is a continuous variable equal to the log of the datadate year less the
first year the firm is observed in CRSP plus one.
Growth is a continuous variable equal to the log of the ratio of assets (at) in t
to assets in t-1.
Std(ROA) is a continuous variable equal to the standard deviation of quarterly
ROA (oibdpq/atq) over a 3 year rolling average.
Std(Capex) is a continuous variable equal to the standard deviation of quarterly
capital expenditure scaled by assets (capxy/atq) over a 5 year rolling
average.
Returns is a continuous variable equal to the daily buy and hold abnormal re-
turns for a year.
Market to Book is a continuous variable equal to the market value of equity (prcc_f ∗
csho) divided by the book value of equity (ceq).
Market Value of Equity
(MVE)
is a continuous variable equal to the log of the price (prccq) multiplied
by the common shares outstanding (cshoq).
YTD ROA is a continuous variable equal to the year to date income (iobdpy) di-
vided by the quarterly assets (atq).
YTD Free Cash Flow is a continuous variable equal to year to date cash flow (oancfy) less
dividends (dvpy and cdvcy) divided by quarterly assets (atq).
Price is a continuous variable equal to the mean price over the quarter.
Bid Ask Spread is a continuous variable equal to the mean difference between the daily
ask and bid divided by the ask and bid divided by two over the quarter.
Turnover is a continuous variable equal to the mean volume divided by shares
outstanding over the quarter.
F-Score
F-Score is a count variable equal to the sum of F_ROA, F_CFO,
F_∆ROA, F_ACCRUAL, F_∆LEVER, F_∆LIQUID, EQ_ISSUE,
F_∆MARGIN, and F_∆TURN.
F_ROA is an indicator variable equal to one if return on assets is greater than
zero and equal to zero otherwise. Return on assets is measured as net
income (ib) divided by beginning total assets (at).
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F_CFO is an indicator variable equal to one if cash flow from operations is
greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Cash flow from oper-
ations (oancf) is measured as operating cash flow (oancf) divided by
beginning total assets (at).
F_∆ROA is an indicator variable equal to one if ROA in year t minus ROA in
year t-1 is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise.
F_ACCRUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if accrual is less than zero and
equal to zero otherwise. Accrual is measured as net income (ib) less
cash flow from operations (oancf) divided by average total assets (at).
F_∆LEVER is an indicator variable equal to one if leverage in year t minus leverage
in year t-1 is less than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Leverage is
measured as total long term debt (dltt) divided by average total assets
(at).
F_∆LIQUID is an indicator variable equal to one if Liquidity in year t minus Liq-
uidity in year t-1 is greater than zero and equal to zero otherwise. Liq-
uidity is measured as current assets (act) divided by current liabilities
(lct).
EQ_ISSUE is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm did not issue equity
in year t and equal to zero otherwise. A firm has issued equity if
its common stock issued (cshi) in year t is larger than common stock
issued in year t-1.
F_∆MARGIN is an indicator variable equal to one if Gross Margin in year t minus
Gross Margin in year t-1 is greater than zero and equal to zero other-
wise. Gross Margin is measured as sales (sale) minus cost of goods
sold (cogs) divided by sales.
F_∆TURN is an indicator variable equal to one if Asset Turnover in year t minus
Asset Turnover in year t-1 is greater than zero and equal to zero other-
wise. Asset Turnover is measured as sales (sale) divided by beginning
total assets (at).
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APPENDIX B
QUOTES FROM BUSINESS PRESS AND INDUSTRY RESEARCH
Below is a collection of quotes from business press and industry research. All bold font is added
for emphasis. All quotes in Section 2.1 are bolded for easy identification.
Exclusive focus on asset management
“more and more high-net-worth investors [are seeking] an independent firm with an exclusive
commitment to investment and wealth management”
Jason Pride quoted in Coyle (2009)
Size
“Most small managers said they are just fine with moderate asset growth and staying relatively
small.”
Comtios (2015)
“Start a small boutique . . . for emerging wireless media and entertainment companies. . . . the fund
would make no more than ‘12 or 14’ investments.”
Sorkin (2006)
“Some investors warn that small boutiques do not have the ability to diversify like their bigger
rivals. The concentration of their portfolios in certain asset classes or regions can also lead to
big losses, if those particular assets or regions underperform.”
Oakley (2014)
Specialization
“As a boutique, if you can specialize in one or two things really well, you can do well... We’re not
trying to be all things to all people.”
Thomas White quoted in Comtios (2015)
“In order for boutique asset managers to survive —or even thrive —in today’s environment, it is
essential that they advertise to asset owners what makes them special. ‘If you have a particular
niche, you have to target the type of client that will be attracted to that niche’.”
Janna L Sampson quoted in Comtios (2015)
“We’re building a highly focused and dedicated boutique”
Joseph Azelby quoted in Jacobius (2011)
“Advisors using boutiques favor the agility these more targeted firms can provide, as well as their
ability to provide specialized or unique investment strategies.”
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RidgeWorth Investments (2014)
“Investors can certainly benefit from the nimble application of ideas within boutique fund firms”
Mark Holman quoted in Comtios (2015)
“The biggest advantage is flexibility and customization”
Chirstopher Neill quoted in Comtios (2015)
“Don’t overload on one boutique’s funds. Some fund families . . . offer lineups of funds that span
a variety of investment styles. Other shops, called boutiques, prefer to specialize in a particular
style.”
Morningstar.com (2006)
Alignment of Interests
“One long-standing charm of narrowly focused boutiques was their interests, in delivering supe-
rior performance, were closely aligned with the interests of the clients who hired them.”
Appell (2009)
“Boutique asset managers come back to provide the education about the asset class as many times
as it requires until the client is comfortable enough to make an investment. The sales takes a long
time, but the rewards are much greater, because the relationship with the client is closer and trust
is higher.”
Jim Cass quoted in Williamson (2007)
“These shops also tend to excel at aligning the interests of portfolio managers and clients.”
Segal (2010)
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